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This paper presents a framework for estimating non-Walrasian models with many markets based on
the virtual price approach in Lee (1986). The paper discusses an open economy multi-market
non-Walrasian model with many agents and government production. The modeling of the labor
market is built on the assumption that each combination of worker and firm is a separate micro labor
market The econometric specification in the paper assumes log-linear virtual prices. Despite the use of
such a simple specification it is apparent that when there are a large number of markets, the
computational burden of estimation becomes heavy due to the large number of possible rationing
regimes. The model presented in the paper can be viewed as a basis for either doing econometric
work within a multi-market representative agent framework or for developing methods for
aggregating across micro markets.
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Introduction
This paper discusses a multi-market non-Walrasian model with many agents which
can be used for empirical work when there are a large number of markets. The
framework discussed in the following is mainly an extension of the virtual price
approach suggested by Lee (1986). It takes into account that there are many agents
in the economy and includes an open economy and government production. It is
assumed that exports, investment, and the budget constraints of the government
firms are exogenous in the model. Imports, the trade surplus, tax revenue, the
public budget deficit, and changes in the money supply are endogenous.
There are two main conclusions which can be drawn from the paper. One is a
restatement of the conclusion in Lee (1986) that it is possible to find computationally
tractable expressions for multi- market non-Walrasian models using a virtual price
approach. The second conclusion is that the assumption that each combination of
firm and consumer is a separate micro labor market leads to a simplification of the
modeling of these markets. Even so, it is clear that estimation in the presence of a
large number of markets is still very cumbersome due to the large number of possible
regimes which must be handled. It therefore seems that in econometric work one
is either forced to working with representative agent models such as the example
discussed at the end of the paper or econometric work must be based on some type
of aggregation approach.
During the twenty years that have gone since the seminal work of Barro and
Grossman (1971) appeared, there has been a steady stream of theoretical and em-
pirical work concerning non-Walrasian models of the economy. It has been argued
that such models are important because it has been observed that quantities often
adjust faster than prices and because a non-Walrasian framework can be viewed as
a generalization of the traditional Walrasian framework. Most empirical work has
been based on fixed-price models where prices are assumed fixed in the short run
without any explicit modeling (or very ad hoc modeling) of price processes.
Econometric work on non-Walrasian models has mainly been based on mod-
els with only one or two markets, such as the canonical neo-Keynesian model first
introduced by Barro and Grossman (1971). This model is based on a very strin-
gent interpretation of the economy, where the economy suddenly shifts from one
regime to another. The smoothing by aggregation approach first suggested by Muell-
bauer (1978) and used in many studies, such as Sneessens and Dréze (1986), Lam-
* bert (1988), and Dréze and Bean (1990), give a more flexible interpretation of the
canonical two-market model, but is still embedded within a two-market framework.
Being confined to a two-market setup limits the possible empirical uses of the non-
Walrasian approach. A more general framework would allow us to study empirically
models with more than two markets such as the open economy models presented
in Neary (1980) and Cuddington, Johansson, and Löfgren (1984) or to study the
interaction between different parts of the labor market split up by production sector
and worker qualifications.
Lee (1986) shows that a virtual price approach makes it computationally possi-
ble to estimate econometric models with a large number of markets. In his paper
Lee considers the situation with two representative agents and many markets. His
approach relies on separable utility and production functions and thereby on a very
simplified modeling of spillovers. The specification of spillovers says how rationing
in one market will influence behavior in other markets. Lee's paper shows that a
fixed-price description using virtual prices is equivalent to the fixed-price specifi-
cation inherent in both the Ito (1980) and the Gourieroux, Laffont, and Monfort
(1980) spillover specifications, even though the excess demand and supply functions
will be different.
The model which is presented in the following is based on the assumption that
prices and wages do not instantaneously clear markets. Prices and wages may be
flexible over time. Our assumption only excludes the case where prices continuously
clear the markets. The model therefore applies both if the economy is characterized
by price and wage rigidities as argued by Romer (1993) or by market failure as argued
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by Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993). We only assume that at any given moment in
time the economy is not necessarily in a Walrasian equilibrium. We assume instead
that it is in a Drèze equilibrium. A Dréze equilibrium is a set of transactions that
are such that they are the result of utility and profit maximization subject to all
quantity constraints that exist, that only one side of each market can be rationed
at a given time, and that net transactions of each non-tradeable good sums to zero
across the economy as a whole. This definition differs from that normally used in
that it includes the possibility of an open economy.
The modeling of the labor markets is built on the assumption that each combi-
nation of worker and firm is a separate labor market, an approach that has strong
similarities with that of Benassy (1987). The main difference is that price tak-
ing behavior is assumed in the following instead of the monopolistic competition
assumption of Benassy's paper.
It is important to note that this paper is concerned with developing a framework
for analyzing a given set of observed transactions. The observed transactions are
viewed as being the result of a unobserved rationing mechanism. Rationing in the
economy is revealed implicitly through the difference between the observed trans-
actions and the transactions that are optimal for the agents. Specifically this will,
in the virtual price approach, be reflected in the differences between virtual prices
and market prices. In the following a general non-Walrasian model is presented first
and subsequently we derive the inverse demand and supply functions associated
with this model. These inverse relationships depend on market prices and observed
transacted quantities.
2 The model
Consider a simple general equilibrium model with four types of agents: M1 private
firms competing in world markets indexed by j = 1, ..., M1 , M2 - MI private firms
sheltered from international competition indexed by j =
 M1 -I- 1, ..., M2 M - M2
government firms indexed by j = M2 -1- 1 M, and N consumers/workers indexed
by j = M+1,...,M+N. Consumers maximize utility, private firms maximize profits
constrained by their revenues in the previous period while the government firms
maximize profits given an exogenously (politically) set budget constraint. All agents
take prices as given in both input and output markets. Government production is
included because it constitutes a significant portion of the output of many economies.
Such production is often supplied to the public at prices that are so low that they
don't clear the markets. A typical example of such production is public health care.
It is natural to treat the output from government production as non- traded goods
consisting mostly of services. Government production is assumed to be used only
by consumers, consists only of individual products (we assume there are no public
goods), is not an input to other production, is not an investment good, and is never
exported. The government sector may buy investment goods from private firms and
from abroad.
Each firm uses money, labor and output from other firms as inputs and produces
one good, so that there are M produced goods in the model including imported
goods. Imports are the difference between transacted and produced quantities of
the goods j = 1, , M1 . If there are imports of a good not produced nationally,
we assume that there is a hypothetical firm which could have produced the good
but which finds such production unprofitable. We assume a non-symmetry between
imports and exports. Exports are governed by longer term contracts and are ex-
ogenous, while imports are residually determined and endogenous. Consumers are
never rationed in their demand for goods that can be imported, but firms may be
rationed in their supply of these same goods because they cannot negotiate new ex-
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port contracts quickly enough. There is one non-produced commodity in the model
which will be referred to as money. Money enters both the utility and production
functions as a means to facilitate transactions and because it is the sole means of
transferring liquidity over time (there are no financial markets in the model other
than money).
As mentioned earlier, each combination of firm and consumer is considered a
separate labor market. Consumers can supply labor to all firms and each firm
supplies goods to all consumers. In principle it is possible for a firm to use all
types of labor and all types of commodities as inputs and it is possible for an
individual to be employed in all the firms in the economy and to consume all types
of commodities. Such a large and general opportunity set both for the firm and
especially for the individual will naturally lead to a large number of corner solutions
which it is necessary to take into consideration. There is of course nothing in the
above formulation which precludes many types of labor or commodities being the
same and being exchanged in the same market at the same price. The above leads
to there being M product markets, M N potential labor markets consisting of the
M firms x the N consumers, and a market for money.
We assume that the length of production for all firms is one period, implying
that for all inputs that are chosen in the current period, output and the resulting
revenues will first accrue in the next period. This results in the private firms being
constrained by a budget constraint similar to that of the consumer'. This approach
is similar to the one taken in for example Böhm and Lévine (1979). They argue that
the firm's maximize a complex intertemporal function, implying that one might just
as well represent the firm's criterion function by a general utility function as by
a profit function. In addition the firms face intertemporal financing constraints,
implying that they face budget constraints similar to the consumer.
'We would get similar results in the following if we assumed that the firm was not constrained
in this manner. The assumption seems plausible and facilitates proving the existence of a Drèze
equilibrium (see appendix A).
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Production and consumption inputs of a good are transacted on the same product
market at the same price. In the following we only look at short term equilibria
and consider the capital stock, investment, exports, and government behavior (tax
rates and the budget constraint of the government firms) as exogenous, along with
prices and wages. The main reason for considering these as exogenous is analytical
tractability, but it can be argued that decisions regarding these variables cover a
longer time period than decisions regarding consumption and production. This
argument can be seen as an extension of the usual reasoning behind fixed-price
models, that quantities adjust faster than prices. We assume that the model has a
fixed-price equilibria of the Drèze type and do not consider the dynamics which can
occur over time. We assume that the demand for money is always satisfied.
Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4 show the main variables in the model. The variable xii
denotes the use of good j either for consumption or as a production input by agent
i. The supply of labor from individual i to firm j is denoted l 7 and the maximum
number of hours which it is possible for an individual to work is denoted L. Imports
of the products that can be produced by the M1 firms facing foreign competition
are denoted zmpi .
For notational convenience we let xi be a vector of the goods used by agent
and
 1 be a vector of the labor supplied or demanded by agent i, where we have
=
1 PC1i7 • • • 7 Xi-1 i7 Xi-Fli 7 • • • 7 XM2ii{x1i 7 • • • 7 Xitfil
1 [IM-Fli7 • • . 7 1M+Nil
when j =
when j = m+1,...,m+N,
when j =
when j = m+1,...,m+N.
The variable invik denotes the amount of good j used by firm k to increase it's
capital equipment,
 Yinv ,j denotes domestic production of good j for use as capital,
and y„phi
 denotes the demand for exports delivered from firm j. These are exogenous
variables. Because of imports, it is possible for Ek inVjk > yinv,i for j =L.-, M1.
Production for consumption and for use as production inputs is assumed to be
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Table 1: Use of goods and services in the model
used by firms
1 	 . • . 	 M
used by consumers
M+1 	...	 M + N
used for
invest.
+ exports
money holdings
m 1
	. • •	 Mm Mm+ i . . • Mm+N
firms facing foreign competition
product /
product 2
•.
prod. Mi
-	 • • •	 x,m
X21	 . • • 	 X2m
•
. 	 •
xmo 	 ... 	 xmi
 m
x, if+ ,
X2 m.4.1
:
•
X mi m1.1
• • •
. •
.
• • .
Xi m+N
X2M+N
:
X mi m+N
Ek 2nV1k + y„p,i
Ek inv2k + Y esp,2
:
Ei  inv.% k + yezp,m,
firms sheltered from foreign comp.
prod. M1+1
•'.
prod. M2
xm, +ii 	 . • • 	 xm, + im
. 	 . 	 •
: 	 . • 	 .•
Xm2 1	 • • •	 XM2 M
xm1+ 1m+ 1
•
•
XM2 M+1
- - -
. •
*
• • •
xm1 +1M+N
•.
•
X M2 M+N
Ek inv mi+ i k
:
-
Ek inVm2 k
government firms
prod. M2 + 1
.
product M
XM2+1 M+1
..
•
x m Ar+ ,
• • •
. .
'
•• •
XM2+1 M+N
.
-
X m m+N
.
labor
labor M+1
.
.
labor M-f-N
1m+11 	 • • • 	 1m+1 Al
. 	 . 	 .
: 	 . • 	 .-
lm+Ni 	...	 lm+Nm
Table 2: List of variables
Production and profits
impi : imports of product j in competition with firm j's production
Yinvj firm j's production of goods used as capital investment in other firms
YezPj firm j's production of goods for export
production for investment and export (Ifi
 = yinvj Yerp,j)
Yi	 total production in firm j minus production for inv. and export
ir :	 profits in firm j from the present period
739 :	 profits in firm j in the preceding period
Prices
vii :	 price of good j when used as capital investment
V2i :	 price of exports delivered by firm j
pi :	 after-tax price of good j for other uses
wij :	 price of labor supplied by consumer i to firm j
Stocks
K3° :	 the stock of capital in firm j at the beginning of the period
C; :	 agent j's total stock of money at the beginning of the period
riefi : money holdings by firm j at the beginning of the period
: money holdings by consumer i at the beginning of the period
fit° :	 aggregate money supply at the beginning of the period
fit :	 aggregate money supply at the end of the period
Li
 : changes in aggregate money supply (fil — fie)
Taxes
tui
	
average tax rate on agent i's labor income
t2 :	 average tax rate on commodity j
t i :	 lump-sum tax transfer to agent i at the beginning of the period
T :
	 total tax receipts
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Table 3: List of variables continued
Constraints
: upper bound on agent i's net purchase of good j
upper bound on the net purchase of labor
	
:	 lower bound on the net purchase of labor
	
y . :	 upper bound on the net sale of good j by firm j
	: 	 maximum number of hours which it is possible to work
Drèze demands and supplies
	: 	 firm j's Drèze supply of good j as a consumption or production input
xli : agent i's Drèze demand for good j as a consumption or production input
	: 	 consumer i's Drèze supply of labor to firm j
	
:	 firm j's Drèze demand for .consumer i's labor (it =	 s*i in equilibr.)
: firm j's Drèze demand for money
: consumer i's Drèze demand for money
Vectors
	p* :	 vector of prices pi,- - • ,Pm
wi. : vector of wages ma, , wim faced by consumer z
	
w.i 	: vector of wages Wm-÷1	 WM+Nj faced by firm j
: vector of upper constraints xki faced by agent j in the goods market
	
:	 vector of upper constraints /ij faced by firm j in the labor market
L.	 vector of lower constraints l faced by consumer i in the labor market
	xi :	 vector of the goods used by agent i
	li :	 vector of the labor supplied or demanded by agent i
: vector of agent i's Drèze demands for goods
	
:	 vector of firm i's Drèze demand for labor
	
1: :
	 vector of consumer i's Drèze supply of labor
md : vector of all the agents' demands for money
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Table 4: List of variables continued
:
dX
Vectors continued
vector of all transacted quantities of labor
vector of all Drèze demands for goods
Virtual prices
consumer i's virtual price for delivering labor to firm j
consumer i's virtual price for buying good j
consumer i's virtual price for money
llJj . firm j's virtual price for buying labor from consumer i
77Z;	 firm j's virtual price for buying good j
firm j's virtual price for selling the good it produces
rein 	firm j's virtual price for money
agent i's virtual income
Other variables
ts :	 the trade surplus
pbd :	 public budget deficit
0 :	 firm j's revenues received at the beginning of the period
oui	 consumer i's share of the profits in firm j
thij •'	 independently distributed stochastic variables
J(k) : an indicator for which side of labor market ij is rationed in regime k
12 (k) : an indicator for which side of goods market j is rationed in regime k
Plii :	 prob. density for the V-s in labor market ij when supply is rationed
P ij :	 prob. density for the 151-s in labor market ij when demand is rationed
:	 prob. density for the t9-s in goods market j when supply is rationed
:	 prob. density for the 0-s in goods market j when demand is rationed
probability that there is an interior solution in labor market ij
P** :	 probability that there is an interior solution in goods market j3
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endogenous and is denoted yi . The exogenous investments made by firm k, invik,
are necessarily related to the production of investments goods by each firm, but
since both investments and production of investments goods are exogenous in the
model such relationships have not been modeled. We let Yi denote the sum of firm
j's production for exports and for investment. Total production is thereby given by
yj = yj -F yin„,j yexpi , where Yi is exogenous. We denote the stock of capital
in firm j at the beginning of the period as Ky. It can either be considered a vector
of the different types of capital goods bought by the firm (taking depreciation into
account) or as an aggregate denoting the total production capital in the firm. It is
in any case outside the scope of this paper to discuss in any detail the composition
of the capital stock. Dividends to the consumers are based on last periods profits
71k .
The after-tax price of good j is denoted pi, while the wage received by consumer
i when working for firm
 i is denoted wij. One should note that wages are both firm
and worker specific. We let thi denote the price of investment goods from firm
 i and
v2i denote the price received for exports (in the local currency). Since we assume
that these prices are governed by longer term contracts, they are not necessarily
equal to the product price pi . All prices are assumed to be exogenous and do not
necessarily clear the markets.
It is assumed that the government levies two types of taxes, one on labor income
and one on commodities (production and consumption inputs) and hands out lump-
sum subsidies. There is no tax on investment goods or on exports. The tax rate on
agent j's labor income is denoted hi, the rate of commodity taxation on good
 i is
denoted t2j, and the transfer to agent j at the beginning of the period is denoted
t3j . The central government sets the budget of the government firms through the
transfer t3j . It is also assumed that dividend payments to the consumer are based
on last periods profits. For notational convenience we let the vector p* be the vector
of after-tax prices [p i, ... wi. be the vector of wages [wil, wim] faced by
consumer i, and w.i be the vector of wages [wm+1 j, , wm+Ni] faced by firm j.
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Since private firms do not demand goods or services from the government firms, we
split the tax-adjusted price vector in two, p* = [pt, p;], where pl. = [pi , ... ,pm2 ] and
P2 = [P M2+1 - - - Pm]-
Money held over the production period by firm j is denoted as mfi and money
held by consumer i is denoted as nici. We let rn°fi and rn°4 denote these money
holdings in the previous period. At the end of each period the firms receive revenue
from sales and the private firms distribute profits. The total stock of money held
by agent j at the beginning of the period is denoted Cif.  This will for the different
agents be
C;
C;
Cf;
+ (1 — t s3i)P.7Y.7	 YL,j
-F (1 — t c2)j )ps7y; v7i
(1 — tc2)5 )pe7y;
m:i
 E ejor; +
7.4si yeozpi 	t30	 =
=
= m2+1,...,m,
=
7r?
3 -1— 633'
where (1 — t3i )p.7 is the price before taxes have been added. The price p.7 is thereby
the after-tax price of a good and 1/((1 — t3j) the tax rate applied to the before-tax
price received by the producer. The total stock of money each consumer i has at
the end of the period is equal to the money held during the previous period plus
the consumer's share of profits in the M2 firms plus lump- sum transfers from the
government. Each firm j holds money held during the previous period plus income
received from sales minus profits paid to consumers (71) plus subsidies from the
government. As can be seen from the equations above, the main differences between
private and government firms is that the latter do not pay out profits, produce
investment goods, or produce for export. In addition we have that only consumers
purchase goods from the government firms.
Since prices and wages do not clear markets, the firms and consumers may be
rationed. Benassy (1975) introduced the concept of a rationing mechanism which
expresses an agent's transactions as a function of the actions undertaken by the agent
and the information he has. The rationing mechanism must be such that the net
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transactions of all the agents are consistent with each other. Examples of rationing
mechanisms are uniform rationing where all the agents face the same rations and
proportional rationing where the rations are proportional to the expressed demands
and supplies. As mentioned, we assume in the following that the economy at any
time is in a Drèze equilibrium. This implies that the information each agent has
consists of the prices, wages, and the quantity constraints the agent faces in all
markets. These quantity constraints consist of an upper bound or
 i and a
lower bound xji or
 j for the net purchase of goods or labor respectively. In the
same manner —yi is the upper constraint on firm j's net sale of good j for use
as a consumption or production input. Note that this constraint does not include
production for investment purposes or for export as these are exogenously given. For
notational convenience we let denote the vector of upper constraints -±"k1 faced
by agent
 i in the goods market, 7..; denote the vector of upper constraints Li faced
by firm j in the labor market, and
 L. the vector of lower constraints /ij faced by
consumer i in the labor market.
The agents' actions consist of expressing their effective demands and supplies to
the markets. Effective demands and supplies are such that they take into account the
information the agents have about rationing and how the rationing will affect them
through the rationing mechanism. In a Drèze equilibrium it is assumed that these
effective demands and supplies are Drèze demands and supplies. Dréze demands
and supplies are the result of maximizing utility or profits subject to the budget
constraint and all quantity constraints that exist. A shortcoming of this type of
effective demand is that it does not send a signal to the markets of the degree of
rationing faced by the agents. The concept of a Drèze equilibrium does not specify
how the quantity constraints are distributed among agents. In the following these
are assumed to be latent. We let yl denote firm i's Drèze supply of good
 i as
a consumption or production input, x agent i's Drèze demand for good
 i as a
consumption or production input, ifj consumer i's Drèze supply of labor to firm j ,
lt firm i's Drèze demand for consumer i's labor, mdfj firm i's Drèze demand for
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[111-1-1i7 *	 7 iclitf-1-Ni]
1:
money, and rn`li consumer i's Dreze demand for money. It is important to note that
the Drèze demands and supplies will equal the observed transactions in a Drèze
equilibrium. In the following we will therefore let variables denoting these also
denote the transacted quantites. The only exception is the labor market where we
will sometimes denote transacted labor by /7i = i:j = We let xl be a vector of
agent i's Drèze demands for goods, 11 be a vector of the firm i's demand for labor,
and 11 be a vector of consumer i's supply of labor, with
d - 	 	 d	 d
[X • • • ,	 Xi÷i • • • XM 'I when j = 1,...,m2 2
when j = M+1,...,M+N
3 = 1,...,m,
=
For a more detailed discussion of different types of equilibrium, rationing mech-
anisms, and effective demands see for example Benassy (1975), Böhm (1989), or
Andreassen (1993).
2.1 Utility maximization
We assume that workers have preferences both over how many hours a year they
work and where they work (their disutility differs according to firms). That in-
dividuals have preferences for where they work might reflect the different working
conditions in the different firms or the location of the firm in relationship to the
worker. In the same manner the firms look upon each worker as a separate input.
Let Ui (mci , xi , li ) be a utility function which is continuously differentiable, increas-
ing in xii and mai , decreasing in /ii and strictly quasi-concave. The quasi-concavity
of the utility function implies that the consumer prefers to consume a variety of
commodities rather that to consume any one commodity. A convex combination
of any two labor bundles (with positive weights) is preferred to either labor bundle
alone. In other words we make the rather unrealistic assumption that the consumers
would prefer working many places to working in only one place.
1	r xd . 	xmd .1	it 7	 7	 t
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Consumer i's holding of the numeraire good money is denoted by md (end-
of-period balance). Money enters the utility function as the only means for the
consumer to transfer purchasing power between periods (besides stock ownership,
which is exogenous). The utility function can therefore be interpreted as an indirect
utility function taking into account intertemporal budget constraints. Another inter-
pretation of the utility function is to view it as a derived utility function into which
the consumer's transactions technology has been absorbed, see Feenstra (1986) and
Samuelson and Sato (1984). Money holdings are assumed to always be positive.
The budget constraint for individual i is
M2
-E(1-	 Epixji+ Md = 172°- +	 -r? t° •
	C2 	 .1t 3	 3t•	 (2.1)j=1	 j=1	 j=1
The traded quantities are Drèze demands and supplies x , l , and nicli resulting
from consumer i maximizing the utility function
Ui (rn cioci, li )	 (2.2)
with respect to mci , x li , - • - , xmi , /a , • - • , /im subject to
C: 
j=1	 j=1
< L,
i=1
o < xji <	j = 1,...,m,	 (2.3)
< x	 = 1 M1
< 0,	 =	 +1,---,m,
> 0,
where L is the maximum number of hours it is possible to work. We assume that in
practice the constraint E l < L is never binding (nobody works 24 hours a day).
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This allows us to ignore this constraint in the following. Note that the consumer is
never rationed in the market for tradeable goods, since any surplus demand can be
met by imports.
Utility maximization yields the Drèze demands and supplies
(z1,14.7p*,w1.,ti1,C7,L) 7 	j	 1,...,m	 (2.4)
xd-
t
• 	 (zi, L., p* wi., til, c:, 	 , 	 (2.5)a
and
d7 7 = D_ mci
	Li., p, 	417 ci? L) (2.6)
for each consumer i. Under the assumption that U(rnd , xili) is strictly quasi- concave
the above problem has a unique solution.
2.2 Profit maximization
Private and government firms maximize profits. We denote firm i's production
function Fj (mh , xj , l , K). The production function is continuously differentiable,
increasing in the arguments, and strictly concave. Money enters the production
function because it is assumed that money holdings are needed for transaction pur-
poses thereby facilitating production and as a means of transferring purchasing
power between periods. The above production function absorbs the firm's trans-
action technologies . in factor markets into the production function. The existence
of such a derived production function can be analyzed in the same manner as the
analysis of including money in the utility function in Feenstra (1986) and Samuel-
son and Sato (1984). See Barnett (1987) for a discussion of monetary aggregation
theory under the assumption that money balances enter both the utility and the
production function.
Generally one might hypothesize that the private firms objectives are more com-
plex than just maximizing short term profits. For example Heller and Star (1979)
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consider the firms's short term objective function to be a function of short run prof-
its, inventory holdings and capital accumulation, dividends, and retained earnings.
Such a short term objective function can be thought of as representing the reduced
form of the firm's intertemporal maximization problem taking into account limited
information and incomplete markets. In such a context assuming that the private
firms are constrained by a budget constraint such as the one above does not seem
an implausible assumption.
The assumption that the private firms are constrained by sales in the previous
period ensures that the production possibility set is bounded. The budget constraint
for private firm j is
C; 
M2E	 E pkxki
i=m+i	 k=1 kOj
M2
E vik invkj
k=1
(2.7)
and for government firm
C; = mfi ri 	„ •° -I- ° + t°
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MA-N	 M2	 M2
—	 ikE wij iij + E PkXki + rn f j + E v_ i _ _nvki,
i=M-1-1	 k=1 kOj	 k=1
(2.8)
where 71 = (1 — t3j )p7y;	 -F tf3j ye'rp denotes the firm's revenues in the
previous period. Note that government firms do not pay out profits to the consumers.
The traded quantities are the Drèze demands 3 kixd l 1 ,4 and Md resulting fromtj 	 fi
firm j's maximizing profits, ri,
7r =3
M2
(	 t2j)piy1 + vii Yinvj V2:7 Yezpj
	
EE pkski
i=m+1	 k=1 kOj
2.9)
-(mfi - nqi)
with respect to mh ,	 , xj_ j_ j , xj+1 j ,	 , xm2i , /m+ii ,	 , im+Ni subject to:
M2	 M
C; — E7.11k inv = Ek=1 
i=m+1
M2
E pkxkik=ikoi
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Y.; =
< —Fi(rnfi,xj,lj, If7)
	 < 0,
	
0 5_ X kj , k	 k j,	 (2.10)
	
0 < xki < Ykj, k =	 k j,
o <	 < 1ij , i =
mfi > 0.
Profit maximization yields the Drèze demands and supplies
	Dl
	,Y3) 7	 =	 (2.11)
.	 zki 	 t2j,
	 -	x
d
k3 = D	 Y:	 k =1,...,m, k j,	 (2.12)
=	 fi 	 W.j7 t2j,
	
(2.13)
and
Y; = F (mdfi ,x1,1ci , K(3?) —	 (2.14)
for each firm j. Under the assumptions that Rrnfi,xj, lj
,
 K;) is strictly concave
the above problem has a unique solution. For government firms we have that Yi =
Yinvi Yezpj = O.
2.3 Taxes, the public budget deficit and the trade surplus
Imports, the trade surplus, tax revenue, the public budget deficit, and changes in the
money supply are endogenous in the model. Total tax revenue for the government,
T, is
	M M -1-N	 M2 M
	 M M-FN
	T = E E
	 E	 E E t2ipixi1 	(2.15)
	
j=1i=m+1
	 j=1 i=lioj
	
i=m2+1i=m+1
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and total subsidies are E N t3i. The government decides exogenously the price
and volume of it's supply of goods and services to the consumers. The resulting
public budget deficit, pbd, can be written as
M-FN
pbd —T E (2.16)
where Eim....21 t3i is the total subsidies to private firms, Eim=m2+1 t3i is the total transfer
to the government firms, and Eim=tfN+1 t3i is the total transfers to the consumers.
The domestic demand for tradeable good
 i E {1, , M1 } for use as a consump-
tion or production input and for investment leads to imports
imp;
	invik
	 E Xji Yj Yinv,j.	 (2.17)
k=1
Short term production yi can not be greater than the short term use of goods E xii ,
itf
impi — E inv jk Yinvj
k=1
M-FNE xji yi 	O.	 (2.18)
Any short term surplus demand is met by imports while short term surplus supply
will imply rationing. This non-symmetry in the assumptions about imports and
exports is done to take into account that it is often difficult for firms to quickly
switch production from domestic to foreign markets. Since there is no import of
products M1 1, M, we have that:
Yinvj	 E invik , 3
 =	 (2.19)
k
and
Yi	 acik,
	 (2.20)
k
Equation (2.19) only covers the goods M1 +1, , M2 since government firms do not
produce goods which can be used for capital investment.
The trade surplus ts is the difference between the value of the production in the
economy minus the value of the goods used in the economy,
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tS = thj(Yinvj — E invii) E V2j Yexp,j Pj(Yj	 E	 (2.21)
i=1	 J=1	 i=1
Since there are no financial markets in our model, the public budget deficit and
the trade surplus must be financed by money. We have earlier assumed that profits
are first distributed in the period after that in which they have been earned. This
implies that in each period there will be a stock of undistributed profits which will
be a component of the total money stock during that period. The total stock of
money at the beginning of the period, tn° will be:
M-FNfr-t0=
	
c?
j=1 3
M2
= E(rne.ii r.; - -I- t;i)	 E (mcf.j r; +4j )J=1	 i=m2+1
M-FN	 M2
+ E (m:i E Owl+ t3j).
(2.22)
j=M+1	 k=1
From the above equation we have that the net acquisition of money balances Arrt
from on period to the next will be
Lh
M-FN	 M+N
E(ri —71) + E(Mfi - m) E (rnd — ned) E (t,
J=1	 j=1	 i=m+1	 J=1
= pbd ts, 	 (2.23)
where we derive the last expression by substituting for rrid —	 — t from the
budget constraint for the consumer and for rnfi - r — refi — gi from the budget
constraint for the firms.
The aggregate money stock held during the period must equal the aggregate
money stock at the beginning of the period minus taxes and an eventual trade
deficit (the transfers t3i are paid at the end of the period). We therefore have that
M-FN	 M-FN
+ E mcli	 E C.; — T+tsj=1	 j=1
=	 — T ts.	 (2.24)
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Neary (1980) discusses a similar open economy model with a representative house-
hold, two production sectors, and a government sector. One production sector pro-
duces a traded good and the other a non-traded good. One of the main results in
Neary's paper is that in a situation where the wage and the price of the non-traded
good are sticky a wage cut may not increase employment and a devaluation may
not improve the trade balance.
2.4 Rationing (Drbze) equilibria
We are now able to prove that the above model is such that there exists a Drèze
equilibrium. Letting {pi} denote the vector of all prices and using similar notation
for the other variables we have that the following theorem applies.
Theorem 1 For any non-negative api}, {wii } , ft lil, ft2j1, ft31 1, {Kt}, {C7}, L,
Drib {invii}) such that p > 0, 1 > t2i > O for all j, 1 > tli > 0, for all i and
wii > 0 for all combinations of =	 and i = m+1,...,m+N, there exist maximum
and minimum constraints ({y.},	 {Li}, -{Tki l) satisfying
1.1 j =
i = m+1,...,m+N, for all = 1,...,m
j = 1,...,m- for all i	 m+1,...,m+N,
k = m1 +1...,m for all j = 1,...,m+N, k j
1.2 y; —	 = 0,	 j =
— l = 0,	 i =	 — 1,...,M
where	 111,...,1Al for i = m+1,...,m+N are the Drè.ze demands and
supplies which solve the problem
max	 Ui(mci, li )
S.t.	 —E(1 — tii)Wijiii+
	
PjXji + mci
j=1	 j=1
L,
j=1
23
o < xii, j =
o 5_ xji
	 =
/-- <	 < 0	 = 1,...,m,
_22 	7
> 0 7
and where d	 id for j = 1,...,m are the Dréze demands
and supplies which solve the problem
	N 	 M-1
max rj = (1 — t2i )pigi — Ewijl _ E pkykj — (mfj
	i=1 	 k=O kj•
M2	 M2
S.t.	 E	 + E pkXkj 171fi = cf; — E vik invkj
i=m+i	 k=1kAj	 k=1
	O  < Fj(mfi,xj,li, if.7)	 <
O < Xic"— 	 3, k =	 k
O < Xkj < Yjk, k = m1 -F1,...,m, k j,
O <	 <
 lik , i = M+ 1 ,--.7M+N7
mfj
 > O.
1.3 1. —y; = yi
 for some j implies that x
 <	 for all i;
2. x =Yji for some i implies that —y; > yi ;
3. = Li implies that It <
4. l = lij implies that
	 >
The constraints ({y-},
	
{Yki}) constitute a Drèze equilibrium at apil,
{wii}, ft1ib{t2i},	 {Kn, {q}, L, {ri}, finvi2 1). In most cases such an
equilibrium will not be unique and there will exist many Drèze equilibria for a given
set of exogenous variables. Note that there are no constraints on the use of goods
1, ..., M1 which can be imported. Proof of theorem 1 is given in appendix A. It
borrows heavily from the proof in Mukherji, Anjan (1990) pp. 153-157, which is a
modified version of the well known result first formulated by Drèze (1975).
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—P	 L)
j=1 j=M1+ 1
(3- 1 )
When we later introduce an econometric specification it is important to keep in
mind that the ensuing likelihood function must be well defined. This is the same
as requiring the model to be coherent, making it possible to infer the distribution
of the observed variables from the stochastic specification. Uniqueness of the Drèze
equilibrium would guarantee that the likelihood function is well defined, but as noted
above, this will in general not be the case.
3 Virtual prices
In the following we derive the inverse demand and supply functions associated with
the model and discuss how the assumption of a Drèze equilibrium implies certain
relationships between these in each market. These relationships are simpler for the
labor market than the goods markets due to our assumption that each combination
of firm and consumer constitutes a separate labor market.
3.1 Using virtual prices to describe the agents' behavior
The Lagrange equation for the consumer i's maximization problem is
	(
Al	 Af
grnd, Xi, li) = Ui(Md, Xi, ii) — Ad Epixji — (1—	 rn --	t E	 - + 
	j=1 	 j=1
where L(m ci, x , li) is the Lagrange functions and Ui(m ci , xj , li) is given in equation
(2.3). Note that j is a negative variable. The Lagrange multiplier A ci is assumed
to be positive and the Lagrange multipliers tt, and the 0-s are assumed to be non-
negative.
The solution to the constrained optimization problem given by maximizing (2.2)
subject to (2.3) can be characterized by the Kuhn-Tucker conditions:
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Or
ar 	 oui (mcioci , ii )
Utlij = 0,
ij
— < 0,
j = 1,...,M 3.2)
<0,
aolij
or 
N44 4'14=0,
or
=	 (3.8)
aUi(mci, xi, li)
ciPi —
_ 0
,	
,; =	 (3.3)
axij
	aui(Mci , Xi, li	
A
	
)	 x
dPi (kcJ iaxii
	axii < a, j =	 (3.4)
axji xji = O,
OL
	= 0,
&ridamd
=	 - (1- t ii) E	 mci — = a,
aAci J=1	 j=1
m
n =	 — < 0,
i=1
att ji =0,
(3.5)
(3.6)
(3.7)
or 
490x.ji
or
ji = O. 1 = M1+1 (3.9)
If we assume local non-satiation (aUi (mci , xi ,	 > 0 for some j) then equations
(3.2) to (3.9) are necessary and sufficient for a unique global optimum (Takayam.a
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(1985) p. 114 and pp. 135-137). As mentioned before we assume that the constraint
L is so high (so many hours a year) that it is not binding for any individual and
therefore p = O.
We now describe the situation with rationing using virtual prices. We define
as the virtual wage for labor supplied to firm j, e; as the virtual price for the good
supplied by firm j, and er as the virtual price for money (which as numeraire is
'always equal to 1). Virtual prices in terms of the money numeraire can be defined
as
811i (rncli, 34,11 ) /8/ii 
aUi (mgi ,x1,11)/Ornd
= (1 — tii)wij
	
(3.10)
and
e7i(m ,L,x1,1:) 	lf vaxji 
aui(mccii ,4,11vamd
pj +4rjj/Aci (3.11)
er =	 (3.12)
which are the prices which support the Dréze demands and supplies, 7-4, 4, and 11
as an unconstrained utility maximization solution given a virtual income Ri . This
unconstrained utility maximization satisfies the budget constraint
d	 1 s
	
774 E	 — E ct.iiii .-_-_, 114
	
j=1	 j=1
(3.13)
and by substituting this constraint into the original constraint we get that the rela-
tionship between virtual income Hi
 and nominal income C° is
M
Ri = -F E(e; — pi)x4- E( (1 — 3 2
.1= 1,	 j=1
(3.14)
In the case of non-rationed goods the virtual prices will be equal to the observed
prices. For a discussion of virtual prices see Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) pp.
xl,	 =
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=	
_
ar
auj
aF7(yhm1.i, xi,
 li)
/23
	 3 < 0,alij
lii =
i =	 (3.17)
109-114. A more detailed discussion of the use of virtual prices in econometric
disequilibrium models can be found in Lee (1986). Note that the virtual price of
labor is defined as the gain in utility from working one less marginal unit of time
while the virtual price of a consumer good is defined as the gain in utility from
consuming an extra marginal unit.
The Lagrangan of the firm j's maximization problem is
gyi,rnfj,xj,li) =
M-I-N	 M2
(	
M2
(1 --- t2i)ri — Af ij E wii iii 4- E pkxk + m i.; -i 	c  + E Vlk invki
i=m+1 	 k=1kOj	 k=1
M-I-N
—Apj (ii (yj , rnfj,xj ,li ) — 0) — Sy (yi -I- y) — E 45,i, (iii - iii)
---3	 i=m+1
Af
Xki E (xki -
k=M1+1,
where 7r is given in equation (2.9) and
F7(yi ,mfj , xj ,1j) = yj 	Fi(mfi,xj,li, K.7).
(3.15)
(3.16)
The Lagrange multipliers Aij
 and Af2j are assumed to be positive while the å's are
assumed to be non-negative.
The solution to the firm j's constrained optimization problem given by (2.9) and
(2.10) can be characterized by the Kuhn-Tucker conditions in the same manner as
in the case of the consumers.
ar 	aFic(yhmfi,xj,li)
= Pk AfljPk Al2j a	 = 0, k =xki
UXki
(3.18)
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ar
=ki+y-&Sy 	—3
ar
sy =ciasy
(1 — t2j
= a,
x OF7(Yi,infi,X j,13 )
Pi - Af2j n
'-'Yi
(3.25)
(3.26)
or
n	 = Pk AfljPk #'f22 	
vXki	 aXki
a.0
	 Xki	 0,
aXkj
kj < 0,
=	 +1,---,m2	 3.19)
,
n,„ = 1 Ab Af2i 	 = 0,j	 am f j
4. M2
aAfij	 L-ds=M+1	 '	 k.1 kOjPkXlci rnfiZ •
+ Ekm_21 v1 k invki — C? = 0,
ai 
=0Af2:7
ai 
= lii — < 0,
i = m+1,...,m+N
(3.20)
(3.21)
(3.22)
(3.23)
ai
as:cki = Xkj —
ai (5-„, =cs
asrk,
Yki < 0,
k =	 (3.24)
One should note that we assume technical efficiency by assuming that yi =
Fi (mfi, li, K7). The above conditions determine the firm's demand for inputs.
The firm's production then follows from the production function. The Drèze supplies
and demands y7 , 4,
 1 , and ml are the optimal solution to the constrained profit
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maximization problem of firm j given the virtual income Ri defined in the same
manner as for the consumer in equation (3.14). We define 71!.i as the virtual wage
for labor supplied to firm j from consumer i, rifi as the virtual price for the good
supplied by firm k to firm j, 77;n as the virtual price for money (which as numeraire
is always equal to 1), and 7.7.
 as the virtual price for good produced by firm j. In the
same manner as for the consumer, virtual prices (in terms of the money numeraire)
can be defined as
aF;(4,Mdfi,X1,11)119V
711 (Mdf	 , 11) =	 3 
a Fr(y.7 ,	 XI ,11)/ aM f
= [(1	 — Sy] 1 + Api ),	 (3.27)
77
	1) 	9F7(y;,mt,x1,11)1,91,,,
9F;(4,mli , x1,11)/omfj '
and
ev,,d „d id\
ilkj "fj,
= wii	 •t s,/(1	 )tf ii),	 (3.28)
aF;(4,md x1, Vaxki 
°F;(4, mt,x1,11)/amfi
= Pk + (Lj /(1 )tpi),	 (3.29)
777 = 1,	 (3.30)
As long as a private firm's budget constraint or the rationing constraint is binding
we have that 771(7-4, x , 11) > ( 1 — t2i )pi . That this is the case when the budget
constraint is binding (Api > 0) reflects the requirement that purchases of inputs be
based on last years sales imposes an inefficiency on the firm. In the following we will
not refer to a firm as rationed when it is only constrained by it's budget constraint,
x1,11) = (1 — t25)pi I (1 + )tfii).
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As an example of how the Kuhn-Tucker conditions (3.2) to (3.9) correspond
to the virtual prices consider the following equations characterizing the consumer's
supply of labor:
OL We) 
	f 	=	
, 
A
d
	i 	1- 
Of
	di •  < (1— t ii)wij if 	+ Ado_ — 	 a, (3.32)
and chi; > 0,
eiL (.) > (1 — t ii)tvii if —OL < 0 and /ii = O.	 (3.33)
From (3.31) it is apparent that if there is an interior solution with no rationing in
the market for labor supplied by consumer i to firm j then the virtual price is equal
to the wage (after taxes). From (3.32) we see that if the consumer is rationed in
this micro labor market then the virtual price will be less than the wage. The last
equation, (3.33), describes the situation when there is a corner solution. From this
it follows that there are several ways in which quantities can be zero. The quantity
used of a good may be rationed at zero level or it be zero as a result of a corner
solution. There is also the special case when the agent's indifference curve is exactly
tangent to the budget line at the point zero. From the equations defining the virtual
price we see that ei is increasing in /1j . The point where C!.i is such that the agent
would like to supply exactly /Zi = 0 of labor is individual i's reservation wage. If
the consumer chooses to work in firm
 i then the reservation wage is lower than the
marginal wage at that firm. The virtual prices will of course depend on all other
variables, for example all other wages. In the same manner we have that consumer
i will not buy good j if the virtual price is lower than the marginal price pi.
Reasoning of this type can also be applied to the virtual prices of the firm.
We have earlier stated that the virtual prices can be viewed as the prices that
would induce unrationed agents to demand and supply exactly the Drèze demands
and supplies given a virtual income Ri . If we assume that consumer i is not rationed
di ()-,-- ( 1 — t - t 1 )w1i = 0,	 (3.31)
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Is 
=	 (efi, • - -
	 el, • - - em, Ri) ,
x i = b.,i(efi, • • • ,	
- •
d
ct =
	 m d(erli, • 'Mi' i1'-
	
• 	 Ri)
* =
= 1 7•••1M,
(3.40)
(3.41)
(3.42)
in any markets, the Lagrange multipliers ski and 0„ij are zero. In this case solving
the Kuhn-Tucker equations (3.2) to (3.9) leads to the notional demand and supply
functions for consumer i,
"ei =
	
•	 =
-dX	 = b (pi , .. • ,pm-,(1-t i )wi l ,	 , (1-tii)wim, CT), j =
ñii d = Ana
 (pi , ...,pm,(1-t i )wi l ,...,(1-t i )wim,q).
and
(3.34)
(3.35)
(3.36)
In the same manner, if we assume that firm j is not rationed in any markets, we
have that the Lagrange multipliers 8/ii , .5xki , and Sy are zero. In this case solving the
Kuhn-Tucker equations (3.17) to (3.26) leads to the notional demand and supply
functions for firm 3,
I^t = Aii (pi ,	 , pm2 , (1-t2Api,wm+ij, • - • , WM+N Cf), j = M+1,...,M+N, (3.37)
-dki =	 zki (pi ,	 , pm2 , (1-t2j)pi,wm+ii,
	
j,Cn, k =
and
(3.38)
ihdfi = Anfi (pi
 , pm2 , ,wm+1 j, - • • , WM+N , C7). (3.39)
One should note that the above functions admit the posibility of corner solutions.
The Drèze demands and supplies of consumer i in equations (2.4) to (2.6) and firm
j in equations (2.11) to (2.13) can now be written using the above notional demand
functions. For consumer i we have
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dki
and
7 11rtf2j7 71J 7 77 1M+1i7
71112i,	 , 711A11-1
• • • 07m-i-N i , =	 (3.43)
(3.44)
(3.45)
!kJ (iì', .
•
= bzki (gip • •
-
	
_d 	 /-1
	fj 	 f j MP • • • ,	 • • • 4)
and for firm j
where 
= pi
 if the consumer isn't-rationed in goods market j,
= pk if the firm isn't rationed in goods market k,
= (1 — tzi)pk if the firm isn't rationed in goods market k,
= (1 — t ii)wij if the consumer isn't rationed in labor market ij,
and 
?4_i 	wii if the firm isn't rationed in labor market ij.
An intuitively appealing measure of the spillover between markets is the differ-
ence between the agents' notional (Drèze) demand and supply functions and the
notional demand functions of equations (3.34) to (3.39). For example the spillover
from other markets to consumer i's demand for good j is according to this measure
bxii (67i 7 • • - Gri, di, • • dm, Ri)
—b(pi , 	 Ri). (3.46)
In the next section we will assume separable functions which imply that spillovers
only occur through the budget constraint.
3.2 Virtual prices in a Drbze equilibrium
We have assumed that the economy at each moment in time is in a Drèze equilibrium.
The assumption of a Drèze equilibrium sets restrictions on how the virtual prices can
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vary in relationship to each other. It implies, in addition to effective demands and
supplies being assumed to be Drèze demands and supplies, that the standard min
condition applies in each market. The min condition says that rationing is efficient
in the sense that for each micro market sellers and buyers can not be simultaneously
rationed. This means, for example, that in the presence of an interior solution we can
never have both ei < (1— t ii)wij
 and i
 wii or both aj > pj and (1+ Afi)i' < Pi
at the same time. We assume that ej
 > 0 and 74 > 0, implying that there is always
a hypothetical wage which is high enough for the worker to want to work at any
firm and a hypothetical wage which is low enough for the firm to want to hire any
worker. We make similar assumptions for the product markets, efi > 0, 77L > 0,
and 771 > O.
It is important to distinguish between two situations in each market, situations
where transactions are zero (Pij =	 = 0 in the labor markets or yl =
in the product markets) and solutions where transactions are positive. As we shall
see in the following, our assumption that each combination of firm and consumer is a
separate labor market leads to a simpler classification of the labor markets than that
of the product markets. The different situations which can occur in labor market ij
can be characterized as follows:
I. /Zi = 0 occurs when one of the following are true:
1.1 > (1 — t ii)wii , which implies that person i is uninterested in working
in firm j at wage wii
1.2 rdi < wii , which implies that firm j is uninterested in hiring individual i
at wage wii
1.3 the special case when we have i j = wii or ej = (1 — t ii)tvij at the point
/7j = 0, which in the first case implies that the firm is exactly indifferent to
hiring or not and in the second case implies that the consumer is exactly
indifferent to working or not.
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The first two cases are corner solutions on one or both sides of the market,
while the last is a special case of an interior solution. One should note that
they also cover the case where there is a corner solution on one side of the
market while the other side is rationed at the point rij` = 0 (for example when
the consumer is rationed, 4i < (1 — and the firm is uninterested in
hiring, 711ij < wii ).
II. /7i > 0 implies an interior solution on both sides of the market (for both the
individual and the firm), and will only occur in the following three cases (here
we take into consideration that both the consumer and the producer can not
be simultaneously rationed):
11.1
 ei5 = (1 — t ii)wii and i > wii , the producer is rationed
11.2 ei < (1 — tii)wij and i = wii , the consumer is rationed
11.3 ej /(1 — t 11 ) = 142 = wii there is no rationing
It follows from 1.3 that these are necessary but not sufficient conditions for /ii
to be greater than zero.
Similar conditions apply in the product markets M1
 -I- 1, , M. As mentioned, the
fact that there are many agents on the buyer side of the goods markets leads to
conditions which are more complicated than in the labor market where each market
only consists of two agents.
y; =
 E2 xli = O occurs when one of the following are true:
HU 1 qi < pi and < pi for all i and j, implying that no persons or firms
are interested in buying good j at price pi.
111.2 (1 + f 1 . )7e > (1 - t2i)pi, which implies that firm j is uninterested in
selling good j at price pi.
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111.3 The special case when we either have (a) i7 = pj and qi = pi at the
point 34
 = 0 for all i j or (b) (1 + = (1 — t2j)pj at the point
y; O.
y; = Ei
 xli > 0 implies an interior solution on both sides of the market (for
at least one buying firm or individual and for the selling firm), and will only
occur in the following three cases:
rv.i =pi or ri; = pi for at least one i and (1 + ApAre < (1 — 2j pi, t e
producer is rationed
IV.2 eaTi > pi or 77; > pi for at least one i and (1 + Af ii)771 = (1 t2i)pi , the
demand side is rationed
IV.3	 p; and 77; = pi
 for all i and (1 + )f ii»g = (1 — t2i)pj, there is no
rationing
The restrictions which apply to way the virtual prices may vary in relationship to
each other when there is an interior solution as described II and IV above are the
consequences of the min condition implicit in a Drèze equilibrium. In the markets
for traded goods 1, ..., M1 the buyers are never rationed because of the possibility
of importing goods. Corner solutions (no transactions in a market) are therefore
solely determined from the demand side of these markets. This implies that 111.1
and III.3a completely characterize the situations when Ei xli = 0. When there is
an interior solution the relationship between sellers and buyers is not constrained
by the conditions set by the Drèze equilibrium, since we apriori have assumed that
only the supply side may be rationed.
Lee (1986) considers mainly the situation where there are only two agents in a
closed economy and there is an interior solution in each market, making it necessary
only to consider the possibilities described in II and IV above. If we allow corner
solutions we also must take into account the possibilities described in I and III. The
possiblity of corner solutions leads to there being a self-selection problem of the type
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much discussed in the litteratur on the econometric specification of labor supply.
In the next section we suggest an économetric specification of the model and
derive the corresponding likelihood function. In doing this we must take into account
each of the different situations described above. An implication of the distributional
assumptions commonly made in the econometric litterature is that situations with
no rationing (11.3 and IV.3) or where there is an interior solution for quantity zero
(1.3 and 111.3) have probabilities of measure zero. These situations need therefore
not be explicitly taken into consideration when setting up the likelihood. When the
probability of there being a non-rationing situation is of measure zero, it has no
meaning to directly test equilibrium against disequilibrium.
4 Econometric specification
We have now described an open economy non-Walrasian model with government
firms and shown how the model can be formulated as an inverse supply and de-
mand system where quantities determine virtual prices. In the following we suggest
functional forms and stochastic specifications along the lines of Lee (1986) which
allow estimation of the model. The suggested specification does not involve multiple
integrals and is thereby more computationally tractable than general multi-market
models. The following extends the set-up of Lee in allowing more than two agents,
incorporating an open economy and explicitly discussing the case when there is the
possibility of corner solutions.
4.1 Log-linear virtual prices
As noted in Lee (1986), for it to be feasible to estimate the above system, it is nec-
essary to assume additive disturbances in the inverse demand and supply functions
denoted by the virtual prices. The virtual prices in equations (3.10) and (3.11) can
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then be written
log di 	rn(L) = aii aii log ml a2ii log (l .; + 1) +
 iii, .1 = 1	 (4.1)
log Gi (xL, IncL)	 cki ali log m — a3ki log (xlci -1- 1) d- ihki, k = 1,...,m, (4.2)
and the virtual prices for the M firms 1,	 M in equations (3.27) to (3.29):
log 7k mdfj , K7) =
gli log rgi — /32ij log (lt -I- 1) + 133ij log If; +
log 7 j (4, md
 Kj) =
cki
 ik log mdfi
 — 134kj log (x idci
 + 1) + /35ki log K;
log 7g(mdfj) = —log (1 + AAA ßij log	 194j,
=	 4.3)
k =	 (4.4)
(4.5)
where 'OW,
	 V3ki, and 1,4j are stochastic variables, while the a-s, f3-s,	 bij, Ckj,
and di are parameters. The stochastic variables are assumed to have white noise
properties. Let giii(thii), g3ki(193ki), and g4i(V4j) be the density functions
of V iij, V2ij, 193ki, and 194j , and G1ij( 19 1ij), G2 (t9), G3ki(193ki), and G4 (t9) be the
corresponding cumulative distribution functions. The white noise properties imply
that the stochastic variables are distributed independently of each other. Labor and
goods supply enter the equations in the form of /ii + 1 and xii -I- 1 so as to ensure
that the logarithm of the virtual prices are well-defined when transacted quantities
are zero.
4.2 Behavioral interpretation
The above virtual prices can be seen as the result of utility and profit maximization
under the utility and production functions
Ui (mcioci , li) =	 1-ali _ E	 + 1) 2i; E	 + 1 1 -a3ii	 4.6)
	j=1
	
j=1
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and
	Fi (mfi l Xkil K;k) =
	 (4.7)
	Mi-N	 M2
(infi) 'f3li + E b( 11  +1) 1- '324 (1q) l-Nii + Ee(x ij -F 1)"4ki (K?1 1-05kj ,k 3 i
	
i=M-1-1	 i=1
where cqi , c;i , li:j , and eii are related to ajj, cji , bii, and cki in the following manner,
1... -I- a2ii]
a	 [ij = log aZi
1
b = lij 	og [kc 1 + 02i 1
 _ pli
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cji = log cj*i 1 — (13ii i[
1 — ali , 
for i =m+1,•--,m+N
and
* 1 — fl4kil
	Ckj	 log Cki=	 3....._ r.[
pi.; 
, 	
for j =1,...,m.
The parameters satisfy
0 < a li < 1, ce,'"i > 0,	 0 <	 < 1,
0 < a2jj,	 c> O,	 0 < /32ii < 1,
< a3ii < 1,	 < /334 < 1,
o < ß4kj < 1,
o < Nkj < 1.
The utility function is continuously differentiable separable, increasing in xji
and nici , decreasing in and strictly concave. The production function is continu-
ously differentiable, increasing in all it's arguments, separable, and strictly concave.
The assumption of separability implies that spillovers only occur indirectly through
the budget constraint. The above specification of the production function implies
decreasing returns to scale if 024 -I- P31j > 1 and 04ki P5kj > 1. The capital stock's
impact on the productivity of labor is reflected in the parameter )33.4 and on the
productivity of other inputs in the parameter 05kj.
39
C k (1-135ki)	 7(K, )(,3ii-P5kj)
b i:j(1-133ii)	 3
(K1(#51c1-03i,j)
CI:J(1-0514)	 :7
(xkj	 1 ) -134ki
aFjoK;
oFilaxki 
aFilarq
- fl2ii 
1 - 133ij 1+
- (34ki 
- 0514 1+
( lij + 1 ) -1324 lq
and
The quasi-concavity of the utility function is, as mentioned earlier, problematic
when the consumer has so many job possibilities, since in practice most individuals
only have one or at most two jobs. The above specifications of the utility and
production functions have the drawback that it is not straightforward to derive
ordinary demand and supply functions for the consumers and firms. The above
specification of the production function leads to the following marginal rates of
substitution2 ,
oFitaxkj
kgi ( 1 
— #2ij) (lij + 1) - 1324 (K1)(05ki —,83i.i)
dZi(1 /340 	 (xkj + 1 )-134"
(4.10)
We see that the above marginal rates of substitution are simplified if /33ii = Nkj•
The above functional forms imply that in the case of the consumer the relaxation of
a quantity constraint for a good will reduce the demand for other goods and increase
the supply of labor, while the relaxation of a quantity constraint for labor supplied
to a certain firm will increase the demand for other goods and decrease the supply
of labor to other firms. The same type of implications hold for the firm.
The above specifications of the utility and production functions leads to a more
general specification of the virtual prices than one gets from the generalized Cobb-
Douglas utility and production functions
UI = log md E azi log (L — lii) E ekcilog xki
1 	 k=1
(4.11)   
2 Expressions for the marginal rate of substitution of capital are included, even though capital
is exogenous in our model.
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and
= log mfi E bsicj iog
 (lij + 1) + E clog
 Xkj.	 (4.12)
k=1
These functional forms also lead to log-linear virtual prices but with less parameters
than those in equations (4.6) and (4.7). For example the logarithm of consumer i's
virtual price for labor supplied to firm j will be
log ei log aij -I- log . (4.13)
The log-linear virtual price utility and production functions described in equations
(4.6) and (4.7) were chosen because they give a richer parameterization of the virtual
prices than the generalized Cobb-Douglas function.
4.3 Possible regimes and the likelihood function
The model has M product markets and M•N labor markets. In the labor markets and
the M1
 -I- 1, , M markets for non-traded and government goods either the demand
side or the supply side is rationed (with the probability of no rationing being of
measure zero). Assuming interior solutions in these markets leads, as discussed
in the preceeding section, to there being two possible situations in each market.
In the labor market either situation 11.1 or 11.2 from section 3 will apply, and in
the product markets Mi -I- 1, M either IV.1 or IV.2 will apply. We define a
regime as one possible combination of such rationing situations in these markets.
In total there will be 2mN+(m-m1) different mutually exclusive regimes (except for
overlaps which have probabilities of measure zero). Regime k will consist of a vector
of MN -1- (M M1 ) elements each describing the rationing situation i one of the
markets.
We now introduce a variable J(k) describing the rationing situation in labor
market ij under regime k and a variable /j(k) describing the rationing situation in
commodity market j under regime k. For notational simplicity we let Ai 1 — Afij .
The two variables are defined as
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1 if riti > (1 — t ii)wii and ej = wiiJ(k) =
	
(4.14)
0 if lk = wii and	 < (1 — tii)wij
for all i and j,
1 if A.4 < (1 — t2j)Pi,
17.7k = pi for all k j,k = 1,...,m,
and eji = pi for all i = m÷1,...,m+N,
Ii(k) = (4.15)
0 if Ai
 rg	 (1 t2i)Pi
>Pi for all k j,k = 1,...,m,
and qi > pi for all i =
for j = mi+1,...,m2, and
I3 (k) = 1 1 if Ailg < (1 t2i)pi and qi = pi for all i = M+1,...,M+N,0 if A .og = (1 — t2i )pi and	 > pi for all i = m+1,...,m+N, 4.16)
for j = m2+1,...,m. The vector
im(k), Jfi(k), • - • ,Jim(k), , • • • , • • • JM-EN1(k), • • • , JM+NM(k)1
will then constitute a description of regime k. Each regime implies that a subset of
the virtual prices in equations (4.1) to (4.5) can be set equal to observed prices or
wages. The equations which apply in regime k will be
log ((1 — tii)wii) = aij ai i log mcli -F a 2ii log (qi -F 1) -I- 'Ow if J(k) =1	
i =
log ((1 tii)wii) = bii 131 j log	 — (32ii log (1c4 -F 1)	 if Jii(k) =
3	 1,...,M
+031i log K; + 192i;
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log pi
 = c 1
 -F PH log rn1 1 — [34ii log (41 + 1)
+05ji log Ki" 4- 193j1
log pi = cim f3im log rrilm — 134jm log (Xlm + 1)
-1-Nim log lqw- 193jm-
log pi
 = ci m+1 -I- al m+1 log mcdm÷,
—a3im4. 1 log (xlm+1 -F 1) 193j M-1-1
log pi
 = ci M÷N + al M+N log mcdm+N
—a3im+N log (4m+N -F 1) + M-FN
log ((1 — t2i)pi ) Ç —log Ai -I-	 log 74 + 194i
7-,M1
log p5
 = c 1
 -I- fin log mid. 1 — 13411 log (xli 1)
-05i1 log Ki) 193j1
log pj = cim Am log mlm — /km log (x.lm -F 1)
+(Aim log Kftf -F 193jm
log pi
 = ci m-44 + al iti+1 log mcd m+1
—a3i m+1 log (x +1
 -F 1) + m+1
log pi
 = ci M-EN -4- al M+N log mdcm+N
—a3i m+N log (xlm+N -F 1) -1- IN m+INT
log ((1 — t2i )pi ) = —log Ai + )31j log	 -1- 19
if
 I(k) = 0
==
if /A10 = 1
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log pi = cj
 M-i-1 + al iti+1 log mcdm+1
- 03j M+1 log (xlm+1 -I- 1) +1,3:7 M-F1
if /j(k) =
log pi = cj M+N + al M+N log mcdm+N
—a3j m_Fiv
 log (xlm+N
 -I- 1) -I- V3jAf-FN
log ((1 — t2i )pj ) = —log A; +	 log mcji
 + 194i	 if /j(k) = 1
The likelihood function is based on the distribution of the observed variables
transformed from the stochastic distribution assumed for the stochastic variables.
This transformation is based on the above system of equations. Our definition of
regime discribes only situations involving interior solutions, while one must often in
addition take the possibility of corner solutions into account. The joint probability
density of the two stochastic variables involved in labor market ij is given by the
	
variable P11 when the supply side is rationed	 = 1) and by the variable
when the demand side is rationed (Jij (k) = 0). These two probability densities can
be written
and
lt3 = Pr (19 1ij1 19 2ij I 	 Wij ei	 ( 1 	t 1 i
= g2i (ð2ij) G11i(19 1ii) • 137j
= Pr (Ow,
	 = (1 — tii)wii) 
where 
= glij(Olij ) • [1 - G2ij(02ij)1 • 137j (4.18)
P7i
 = Pr (Vilj
 > ()Xi
 >
= [1 — Glij(i9lij)]
	 G2ij (02ii)	 Glij(i9lij)] G2ij( 19 2ii)
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4.19)
for i = M + 1, ..., M + N. The probabilities above consist of a density for the
disturbance term of the equation for the side which is not rationed (for example in
the last equation this will be giii(Viii)) times the probability that the other side is
rationed ([1 — G21i(192)]) times the probability that there is no corner solution in
the market (13 7i). The probability of corner solutions is explicitly taken into account
through the probability 137i , which gives the probability that there is an interior
solution in labor market ii. The probability P j can be viewed as a sample selection
correction of the type often employed in econometric analysis of labor supply.
Similar probability densities can be derived for the goods markets j =
 M1 +
1, ..., M. The joint probability density of the stochastic variables (assuming that
they are independtly distributed) in goods market j is given by the variable P12, when
the supply side is rationed ( 13 (k) = 1) and by the variable Pfj when the demand
side is rationed (/2 (k) = 0). These two probability densities can be written
Pi? = Pr (1.94i 7 '33j143j27 . . 193j MA-N A4
	
1-42.01):7 7 717k =
or qk = pi for at least one k j)
= G4 (t9) - H (g3ik(V3ik) Pr (xlk > I Zik > 0 for all at least one k))
Ic#j
Pr (y; > 0, Xlk> 0 for at least one k)
and
= G4,04.0 -
	 g3i,o3ik)
	 -
koi	 koi
G3kj(193ki)
G3kj (19 3ki)
(4.20)
where
P'2 = Pr (193j1 Ihj27 • • • '63j M-FN	 = (1-42.0pi 777k2
or > pi for at least one i =
= g4 (ð4 ) 11[1 G3ik(V3J0]-
koi
(4.21)
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= Pr (yi > 07
 4k > 0 for at least one 1c 7 )	 (4.22)
	
= [1 — G4 04.0] + [1 — II G3kj(V3kj)] — [1 — G4j(t4j)}{1	 G3ki(t93ki)]
for j = 1, ..., M. If we assume that there is always is an interior solution we
can set Pis; = i
 and Pr = 1. For the 1, ..., M1 markets where the demand side never
is rationed we have the following probability density for the stochastic variables:
Pori = Pr 04j7 1,3.0.7 193j2, • - •193i_m+N)
= g4j(19 j) - H g3ik(t93ik) • [1 — a4i(V4i)]- 1-1 G3ik(t33ik) 	 (4.23)
koj	 koi
where [1 — G4 (194 )} • nkoi G3ik(t93ik) is the probability of an interior solution.
We see from the above that these probability densities have a simpler structure
for the labor market than for the goods markets. Using the above notation we can
now write regime k's contribution to the likelihood function as
M1
Lk(a, 0, a, b, c, A 7 0 I md ,1*,xd ) 	 I ilk(md 7 1*,xd )I
 IT P(T. 	 (1)')Ii(k)
	3 	 1j
j=1	 j=M1+1
MA-N
IT (pz)(0.– Ii(k))	 (phii . ) ./ii(k) 11 (p ii )(1–Jii (0) (4.24)
j=M-1-1 	 3 	 j=M+1
where Hk(Md ,1* Xd) is the Jacobian of the transformation from the 19-s to the ob-
served variables in regime k, a, 0, a, b, c, A are vectors of the structural parameters,
and O is a vector of parameters of the distribution functions. The regimes are defined
so that they are mutually exclusive (with exception for situations with probability
of measure zero). The total likelihood function will be
r(a 7 0 7 a, b 7 C7 A, 0 md,r,xd) = 	 .Ck(a,ß 7 a,b, c, A 7 0
 I md, xd). (4.25)
k
The likelihood does not involve multiple integrals, but may still be computation-
ally cumbersome when there are many markets, because increases in the number
i=m1+1
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of markets increases the number of regimes exponentially. In addition, the more
markets there are, the more important it becomes to take into consideration corner
solutions, and it might become difficult to get detailed enough micro data. It would
seem that at present one in empirical disequilibrium work is restricted to either work
within a representative agent framework assuming a small number of markets (but
more than the usual two markets) or devise methods for aggregating across a large
number of markets. In the next section we briefly give two examples of the type
of models which can be estimated within a representative agent framework and in
a later paper we will present a method for aggregating across labor markets within
the model presented in this paper.
4.4 Two special cases of the model
Assuming independently normally distributed stochastic variables, the econometric
model presented above can be used to estimate virtual prices and thereby describe
the extent of rationing in an economy. A measure of such rationing is the probability
that the virtual price for a good or labor in a given year is different from the observed
price. If one also assumes that the behavioral interpretation given in the preceeding
section holds, then it is possible to estimate many of the structural parameters of
the utility and production functions.
4.4.1 An open economy model
In this section we illustrate how the model can be used by discussing two different
special cases. First, consider a simple two-sector open economy model with one
producer of a traded good 1, one producer of a non-traded good 2, no government
firms, and one consumer i 3. This can be seen as a simple extension of the canon-
ical neo-Keynesian two-market model, where there is only one commodity and one
labor market and it is assumed that the economy is closed. With modifications this
specification can be used to estimate models of the type discussed in Neary (1980)
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and Cuddington, Johansson, and Löfgren (1984). Using the notation introduced
earlier we have M1
 = 1, M2 = 2, M 2, N = 1, and M + N = 3. The two-sector
model implies that there are four markets where the following virtual price equations
apply,
1. One product market for the traded good:
1 	log Cml i) = —log A l + /31 I log mdfl + V4 1,log rli2(xit 27 m df2)ef 13 = c12 + fil 2 log 77/12 — #4 12 log (42 + 1 )+/35 12 log K 	V3 12,log 3 (x 3, 771) = C13 + a i 3 log rnS + a3 13 log (43 -I- 1) + '02 137
2. One product market for the non-traded good:
1
2
I log rifi (417 m11 )
log 7g (mdf2 )
log ef3(e 37 mS)
= d21 A. 21 log nefi l — ,34 21 log (4 1 1)
05 21 log + 63 21,
= —log A2 )31 2 log mdf2 + 1,4 27
C23 4- a l 3 log 	a3 23 log (4 + -+- 193 237
3. Two labor markets (one consumer and two producers):
log a1(417 m,13) 	log a31 al 3 log InS a2 31 log (4 1 + 1) + '61 1. 31,
3	 log 7.41 (41 , mdf1) = b31 	log m11
 — 02 31 log (1 I. 1)
+03 31 log KT 
-F 12 317
log d2(42 , mS)	 log a32 -F al 3 log rnS a2 32 log (42
 + 1) + 01 327
4	 log 2(l2, m 2 ) 	10 --i- 3 1_32 ,
	 2 _og rn42 -- /32 32 log (4/2 + 1)
+03 32 log If; + '02 32 •
In this model there are 8 possible regimes
regime 1	 12(1) = 1 J11 (1) = 1 J12(1) = 1
regime 2:
	12(2) = 1 J11 (2) = i J12(2) =
regime 3:
	12(3) = 1 J11 (3) = 0 J12(3) = 1
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regime 4:
regime 5:
regime 6:
regime 7:
regime 8:
12(4) = 1 J11 (4) =O J12 (4)
12(5) = 0 J11 (5) = 1 J12 (5) = 1
12 (6) = O J11(6) 1 42 (6)
/2 (7) = O J11 (7) = 0 J12(7) 1
12(8) = 0 J11 (8) = O J12(8) = 0
As an example we now consider regime 6. In this regime the following equalities
apply:
t91
 = —log Al A. I log mdf1 — log p i. ,
'p3 12
 = C12 + fll 2 log m id-2 — (34 12 log (xcl.2 + 1)
+#5 12 log 1<-11 — log pi.,
t92 13
 = C13 + a l 3 log rncl a3 13 log (43 -I- 1) — logpi ,
193 21 = —log A2 + ßi 2i logri41 — ß4 21 log (4 + 1)
(4.26)
(4.27)
(4.28)
+05 21 log .K1°. — log p2 ,	 (4.29)
193 23	 C23 + a l 3 log mcci3 a3 23 log (413 + 1) — log p2 ,	 (4.30)
19 1 31 = log a31 + a l 3 log n-43 a231 log (gi + 1) — log w31, 	(4.31)
L9232 = h	 log-32 ,
	
—12 — 02 32 log (1 ,12 + 1)
+03 32 log K — log w32,	 (4.32)
This is a linear system where the stochastic variables are uniquely determined by
the observed variables. This ensures that we have a coherent model.
Since there are so few markets, it seems natural to assume interior solutions in
all markets. We thereby get the following probabilities
Pi 31
P 231
P l  32
=(79	 ri	 a 	 (19	 11
01 31 -- 1 31/ • L- — —231 231/j
g2 31 (192 31) • G1 31( 1h 31)
32(vi 32) - - G2 32( 172 32)]
(4.33)
(4.34)
(4.35)
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P l2 32 == g2 32(232) G1 32( 9 1 32)
for the two labor markets and
Pf 2	 G4 2 (t94 2) ' g3 21 (t 3 21) • g3 23 (153 23)
P 2 = g4 2 (t 4 2) • [1 — G3 21( 1 3 21)] ' [1 — G3 23(t3 23)] ,
Pol
 = g4 1(l94 1) - g3 12(t93 12) g3 13 ( 93 13)-
(4.36)
(4.37)
(4.38)
(4.39)
for the two goods markets. By substituting in from the equations (4.26) to (4.32)
for the virtual prices we see that the above equations depend only on observed
transactions.
The contribution to the likelihood from regime 6 will be
£6(a, 0, a, b, c, A, O I md , rk , xd) = 1 H6 (md , 1* , xd) po 1 (1)1 2 )12(6)(8 2)((1-h(6))
(P1 31) 1131 (6) (P2 31) (1—j31(6)) (P1 32 ) j32(6) (P2 32) (1-42(6))
	 (4.40)
where H6(md ,1*,xd) is the Jacobian of the transformation from the V-s to the ob-
served variables in regime 6. The other regimes can be treated in a similar manner.
4.4.2 A labor market model
As can be seen from the open economy model, the use of linear virtual prices leads
to a fairly simple structure. Our assumption that each combination of individual
and firm is a separate micro market implies a particularly simple structure in the
labor markets. The inclusion of a government sector was earlier motivated in part
by referring to the large proprotion of the labor force in many economies which
work in the government sector. The above model seems therefore well suited for
analyzing bottlenecks in the labor market. As an example consider an 8 regime
model where there is one representative firm producing a traded good (j = 1), one
representative government firm (j = 2), and three types of workers each having a
certain educational level (i = 3 4, 5). We could for example distinguish between
high school graduates, college graduates and others. We assume that buyers are
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never rationed in their demand for the traded good and are always rationed in their
demand for the government good. This last assumption implies that parameters
pertaining to demand for government goods can not be estimated. The labor market
is assumed to be such that private sector firms are never rationed but the government
firms and workers may be rationed. These assumptions reduce the number of regimes
in the model. In general the model, as described in the earlier parts of the paper,
would imply 27 = 128 regimes because there are six labor markets and one product
market where both sides of the market can be rationed. After taking our assumptions
into account, this reduces to 23 = 8 markets, because now only it is only possible
for both sides of the market to be rationed in three of the six labor markets.
This model can for example be used to analyze to what degree government pays
too high wages to those with little education and too low wages to those with much
education. It implies that there are eight markets where the following virtual price
equations apply,
1. One product market for the traded good:
1 1 log 77 1! (77111)log 77172 (xf2 , m12) —log A l +	 log mcfl i 124 1,C12 4" /31 2 log mdf2 — [34 12 log (412 1- )+P5 12 log K c2) 4- 193 127C13 + a l 3 log mc,!3 a3 13 log (43 -F 1) + 1 2 13,C14 a i 4 log 7744 ci4 14 log (44 + + 1,2 14,= C15 + al 5 log mdc5 a5 15 log (45 d- 1) + t215,log e3(43, nic13)log ef4 (x14 , rnc14 )log ef5 (x15 , mcd5 )
2. One product market for the non-traded good:
2	 { log 7g (rndf2 )	 —log A2 + pi 2 log m12 -I- 19
- 4 2
3. Six labor markets (three consumers and two producers):
log 1(l1  InS)	 log a31 a l 3 10g mcL -F a2 i log (l 1 + 1) +1 31,31,
3	 log 17 l (P3/1 , m f`1 1 ) = b31
	
log m11
-03 31 log iff. 4- 1 23i,
— /32 31 log (11 + 1)
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log (42 , 74)
4	 log zA2 (g27 m12 )
1 log el41 YID mcc/4 )
5	 log 77,1 1 ND m1 1 )
1 log e42 (112 , mg4 )log 742 (42 , M12 )
log di (igi md.5)
7	 log ?Ai (go 74)
1 log C152(427 Mg5 )
8	 log ig2(4/27 m12 )
= log a32 c 3 log m c13 a2 32 log (42 + + 19 1 32,
= b32 01 2 log m 2 — [32 32 log (lg2 + 1)
+P3 32 log if; + th 32 •
= log a41 -F al 4 log mcd4 a2 41 log (41 -1- 1) + th 41,
= b41	 log mdf1 — 132 41 log (41 + 1)
-03 41 log KI°. + 19 2 41,
= log a42 al 4 log mc4
 a2 42 log (112 + 1) + 'di 42,
142
 + pi 2. log m 2
 — (32 42 lOg (42 1)
+03 42 log if; -F 61 2 42-
= log a51 d- a l 5 log mdc5 a2 51 log (41 -I- 1) + V1 51,
= b51	 i 	mdfl --- /32 51 log	 + 1)
	+03 51 lOg	 th
= log a52 a l 5 log 771,dc5 a2 52 log (42 -I- 1) + 01 52,
= b52
 01 2 log mdf2 — 02 52 1.0g (1g2 + 1)
+03 52 log iq 19 2 52-
In product market 2 we have only included the virtual price for the government
firm, since the consumers are always rationed in this market. The likelihood function
can now be found in the same manner as we have done earlier in the paper.
Even though this example demonstrates how bottlenecks in the labor market can
be analyzed using a representative agent model, it is a drawback that it does not
incorporate the number of individuals with different types of education. One would
for example expect that the number of individuals who have little education will
decline over time and that the weight of the different reprentative workers therefore
change. Such problems point to the need to find explicit aggregate relationships
instead of only working within a representative agent framework.
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5 Summary
This paper has discussed a multi-market non-Walrasian model with many agents
which can be used for empirical work when there are a large number of markets.
The main aim has been to develop a method for describing the extent of rationing
in an economy and to estimate structural parameters under rationing. Rationing
in the economy is in the model revealed implicitly through the difference between
the observed transactions and the transactions that are optimal for the agents. The
framework used in the paper is mainly an extension of the virtual price approach
suggested by Lee (1986), allowing for more than two agents, incorporating an open
economy and explicitly taking into account the possibility of corner solutions. It
is assumed that exports, the capital stock, investment, and the budget constraints
of the government firms are exogenous in the model, while imports, the trade sur-
plus, tax revenue, the public budget deficit, and changes in the money supply are
endogenous. The model is based on explicit utility and profit maximization, where
both consumers and firms face budget constraints. These constraints and the intro-
duction of money into the utility and profit functions can be considered as ways of
introducing liquidity constraints. The rather primitive nature of these assumptions
are partly related to the static nature of the model. Any future extension of the
model to include for example price determination will introduce dynamic consider-
ations making it desirable to also look closer at how expectations are formed and at
the intertemporal allocation of assets.
In the model it was assumed that the economy at any time was in a Drèze equi-
librium and it was demonstrated that such an equilibrium exists. The modeling
of the labor markets was built on the assumption that each combination of worker
and firm was a separate micro labor market, leading to a simplified econometric
modeling of the labor market. The model was formulated as an inverse supply and
demand system where observed quantities determined virtual prices. The assump-
tion of a Drèze equilibrium sets restrictions on how the virtual prices could vary
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in relationship with each other. These restrictions were utilized in caluculating the
likelihood function for the observed variables.
The econometric specification of the model assumed that the virtual prices were
log-linear in the observed quantities with additive random variables. The parameters
can be interpreted as structural parameters derived from the agents' utility and
production functions. The chosen specification is such that the likelihood does not
involve multiple integrals, as originally shown in Lee (1986).
In the last part of the paper two special cases of the model were discussed. One
was an eight regime two-sector open economy model with one sector producing a
traded good and the other a non- traded good. The other was an eight regime
labor market model looking at bottlenecks in the labor market. It could be used
to examine how wage differences between the private and public sector affect these
sectors' supply and demand for workers with different levels of education.
Despite the use of a simple econometric specification it is apparent that when
there are a large number of markets, the computational burden of estimation be-
comes heavy due to the large number of possible rationing regimes. Increases in the
number of markets increases the number of regimes exponentially. In addition, the
more markets there are, the more important it becomes to take into consideration
corner solutions, and it becomes more difficult to get detailed enough micro data. It
therefore seems that in econometric disequilibrium work one is either restricted to
working with representative agent models such as the examples discussed at the end
of the paper or one must derive explicit aggregate relationships. A problem with
representative agent models is that the number of individuals or firms represented
by each agent will vary over time. In a later paper the framework discussed in this
paper will be the point of departure for deriving explicit aggregate labor market
relationships.
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A Existence of Drèze equilibrium
In the following we will prove the existence of a Drèze equilibrium for the model
discussed earlier in the paper. The proof is a variant of that first presented in Drèze
(1975). The exposition borrows heavily from Mukherji's (1990) pp. 153-157 ver-
sion of the original proof in Drèze (1975). Before proceeding to the proof, some
added notation is introduce so that it is possible to represent prices, quantities
(demanded, supplied and transacted quantities), and constraints for all goods and
labor in a parsimonious manner. Our assumption that each combination of firm
and individual is a separate type of labor le6,cis to the notation being a bit complex.
The firms' maximization problem is formulated in a manner which is analogous to
the consumers' (maximizing a criterion function, which is strictly quasi-concave in
the decision variables, subject to a budget constraint). The first part of the proof
(sections A.1 and A.2) proves the continuity of the consumers' and the firms Drèze
demand and supply functions. These proofs are based on first showing that the
budget correspondences faced by the consumers and those faced by the firms are
lower hemicontinuous (lemma 1 and lemma 3). The lower hemicontinuity proofs
for the consumers and firms differ in that in the case of the consumers there is a
constraint on hours worked, while in the case of the firms the production function
induces a constraint on their output. After showing lower hemicontinuity, continu-
ity of the Drèze demand and supply functions is proved (lemma 2 and lemma 4).
Finally, in section A.3 the existence of maximum and minimum constraints for any
set of prices and exogenous incomes is proved (theorem 1), under the condition that
demands and supplies are of the Drèze type (condition 1.2 in theorem 1) and that
the min condition is satisfied for each good and for each type of labor (condition
1.3 in theorem 1). The proof of theorem 1 is based on using Brouwer's Fixed Point
Theorem.
As mentioned above, we need to introduce some new notation in addition to that
used in the main part of the paper. This notation is based on vectors of all the goods
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and labor in the model instead of just those pertaining to each agent. Such notation
makes it easier to formulate the equilibrium conditions. From the main part of the
paper we had that the 1-FMA-MN vector of commodities and labor exchanged in the
economy was
[rn, x i ,	 , xm, W44,. . .,im+N]
where the vector 1i =	 1i2,	 lim] is individual i's supply of labor, rn is money,
and xi is the commodity produced by firm i. The number of firms is Af and the
number of individuals is N. As discussed . earlier in the paper each individual's
potential supply of labor to each firm is viewed as a separate commodity. This leads
to there being M.N types of labor and iti+1 types of goods (including money). The
corresponding price/wage vector q can be written
.=
where the vector wi
 = [wa, wi2,
	
wim] contains the wages which apply to individ-
ual i's supply of labor. The elements of the vector q are numbered from 0 to Ml-MN
so that we have qo
 = 1, qi = pi and so forth.
We index the agents, as before, both firms and individuals by i =1,...,m+N, where
1,...,/tf are firms and i = M+1,...,M+N are consumers. Their net demand of commodi-
ties and labor is given by the (i-Fm+mN) vector zi. In the case of the consumers
(i m+1,...,m+N) money is denoted by 4, = m.j , commodities with disutility (labor
supply) by -tik ,3 and the remaining commodities by xii. The consump-
tion/labor supply vector for consumer i can thereby be written
[zoi 	 zni
r 	 x1i7 - • 7 XM-i7 07 . . . 7 0 7 - lib -427 . . . 7 - IiM7 0 7 • . .	 7
where n = Itl-FAIN.
3The relationship between the subscripts is given by j = (i — M)M -I- k or k = j — (i M
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In the case of the firms we denote money by z = mfi , labor demand by z
 = iki,4
and the remaining inputs by z = xii . It simplifies the notation later to exclude the
firm's output from the vector zi by setting 4 = O. As before we denote firm i's
endogenous output by yi and the exogenous output (exports and production for
investment purposes) by Y. The input vector for firm i can thereby be written
	z i 	[z,f), .	 zni
= {Tflfj, Xli, • • • 7 X(i-l)i7 0 7 X(i+l)i7 • • . XM2i 7
07 . . 7 07 1M+i 7 0 7 .•. 7 0 7 12M+j 7 07 .. . 7 0 7 IMNi-i7 07 . . . 7 .
The taxes faced by consumer i are given by the 1+M-1-MN vector ri,
ri = [1,	 1, (1 — t 1i),	 (1 — t 1i), 1 , .	 1]	 for i = M+1,...,M+N,
where (1 — t1i), , (1 — t1i) are the taxes on labor income paid by worker i. Since
such taxes do not vary between firms this series consists of M equal tax rates.
The maximum and minimum constraints faced by the consumers (i = m+1,...,m+N)
are denoted by
si = SiM1 +1 7 • 7 stil = [7M1	 . • • 7Mi}
and
si = [Si(i-M)M-I-17 • • • 7 si(i-M)M-FM] = IIL17 • • • 7 kM17
	where Si =
	 > 0 and s = Lik < O. The vector Si denotes the constraints on the
amount of goods that can be bought from the firms producing non-tradeable goods,
while the vector Si denotes the constraints on the amount of labor consumer i can
supply to these firms.
In the same manner the constraints faced by the firms (z = 1,...,m) are denoted
si = [st] =
'The relationship between the subscripts is given by j = (k M)- M or k = (j	 M M.
5 See footnote 2.
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and
	si	 [SiMi+1, • • • , qi 	S1+, SiM2 51144, 	 i9 j1W.A..i, • • • , SiMN+i]
- 	 - - - ,T; m2i3m-1-1 - jm+N
where SI = > O are constraints on the input of commodities when j =
	and SI =	 > 0 are constraints on labor when j = Mi-i,2M+i,3M-14,...,MN4-i.6 Note
that the constraint si
 < 0 is not a constraint on the production possibility set, but
a constraint on sales. There is no constraint on money, 4) .
Using the above notation the utility function ui for consumer i can be written
u(z) = Ui (rnci, Xi , li), 	 (A.1)
where Ui is the utility function used in the earlier part of the paper. The utility
function ui is an increasing function of all its arguments. The production function
fi can be written as
f1(z)	 Fi (mfi , xi , li , Ki ),	 (A.2)
where Fi is the concave production function from the main part of the paper and
Ki is the capital stock at the beginning of the period. The production and utility
functions are assumed to be continuously differentiable functions, the utility function
to be strictly quasi-concave in the consumers' relevant variables, and the production
function to be strictly concave in the firms' relevant variables' (by relevant variable
we mean a variable which level can be chosen by the agent in question, see also
footnote 9). We also assume that f(-) and thereby f(z) is non-singular so that
fi (zi) = 0 implies zi
 O.
6 See footnote 3.
7Even though the functions u 1 (z) is not strictly quasi-concave or fi(,) strictly concave in all
the arguments, the fact that they are so in all variables relevant to the agent ensures that we get
a unique solution to each agents maximization problem.
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The profit function for firm i, ir , is defined as
r1(z) = (1 — t 2i )qiyi qzi 	(A.3)
The continuity and differentiability of the production function imply that the profit
function r i is also continuous and differentiable.
Note that the profit function ir(z) is strictly quasi-concave in zi if the production
function fi
 (zi) is strictly concave. This is easily seen by assuming two sets of
production inputs z and z' (the index i is suppressed) such that 7i- (z) > 7r (z')
(z) > 71-(z') implies that 1(z) f (z') > pg-(z z'). Strict concavity of f (z) implies
that f(Az -I- (1 — A)z') > Af(z) -F (1 — ))f(z') for 0 5_ A < 1. Taking these two
equations together leads to f (Az + (1 — À)z') — f(zi) > p2-(z z') implying that
r (Az + (1 — )t)z') > r (z') which is the definition of strict quasi-concavity.
Above we have defined the vector zi so as to include all goods and types of labor in
the economy. Since each type of labor is firm and individual specific, many of the ele-
ments in this vector must be zero. Individual i cannot for example sell individual j's
labor. We let the set Ai denote the elements of the vector zi which are independent
choice variables for agent i (all other variables will be zero) 9 . For consumer i it will
	
contain 1+2M elements, A =	 zi,	 , z ,7 iM+M(i-M-1)+11 • • • ZiM+M(i-M-1)+M} 7
while for firm i it will contain N+M elements, Ai = {zo, , 444, Zim2
Zim+0 4t14.0 4m+i, . ZimN+J. The firm's output, 4, is not included, since it fol-
lows from the production function when the inputs have been chosen. Let Ci de-
note the initial quantity money of agent i at the beginning of the period and L
the maximum time each consumer can work. Now consider the utility and profit
maximization problems
	
max	 ui (zi )
zi€Ai
	
s.t.	 zi E idvic (s i , Si , q, Tt, C, L)
8Note that we use 7r for profits as a function of the inputs z and not in the usual sense of being
the maximal profits as a function of prices.
9 Given agent i's constraint set ai, the variable zj is a relevant variable if there exists a 2 in ai
such that î > O. The set Ai is then the set of relevant variables for agent i.3
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and
	max	 7ri (zi )
zi Edo
	s.t.	 zi E
where
! (8i , si, q,
 r , Ci,L) = z : rqz1 < Ci
 ,
E < 1,,
i=m+1
<	 =
o < <
5_ -4 5_ 0, j =
z.,f) > 0,
= 0, for all	 Ail
and
-y f (si , 5i,
 q, Tt, Ci, Yi) = Izi
 : qzi .5_ Ci ,
< 0,
<	 j = 1,...,mi ,
05_ z Sip =	 i,
z. = 0, for all j Ai} .
Utility maximization yields the vector of Dr6ze demands and supplies zi(s , S , q, Tt,
Ci,
 L) for each consumer, while profit maximization yields the vector of Drèze
demands zi(si, 5t,
 q, tv,
 C, Yi) for each firm. The strict quasi-concavity of the utility
and profit functions in the relevant variables assures that the utility and profit
maximization problems have unique solutions. We set the element covering the
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firm's output equal to zero, 4(s,
	 0, and instead let the Drèze
output from firm i be denoted yi (si , S, q, t2 , C, Yi ) . All elements of these demand
vectors which are not choice variables for the agent are equal to zero. The only
difference between private and government firms in the present context is that for
government firms the sales constraint is an equality, fi(z i )
Before proceeding to the proof we define what is meant by the budget set and
the budget correpondence of the agents.
Definition Let -y be a correspondence R m x R14w: x Er'x R1 x R.F x R.f. -÷
such that z i E -y!(si 	ri, Ci , L). The function 7! will be referred to as the con-
sumer's budget correspondence and 7ci(s i , S, 	as her budget set. In the
same manner we define the firm's budget correspondence ifif as the correspondance
R_ x .1i)4t_f+N x 14+ 1 x ME x x R+ RI+1 such that zi E yif (s i, ,q,tv,
where 7if (s i , Si , q, t2i, Ci , Yi) is the firm's budget set.
A.1 Continuity of the consumers' Drbze demand and supply
functions
Lemma 1 The consumer's budget correspondence if is lower hemicontinuous at
every point (si,
 S,  ,L) such that qi > 0, rj > 0, s O < S for all j,
Ci > 0 and L > O.
Proof: We prove this in three steps. Before proceeding we define
aic(si , Si) = {zi : O<z , j =
0 <	 < S32:, 	 = mi +1,...,m,
5_ 0, j
.4) 	0,
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and 
3 = 0 7 for all j Ø Ai}
n 
pnc(st,	 L) = E L
i=m+1
o < 	 j= 1,...,M1 ,
o < < 	 =
— 3 — 3 7
sl	 5_ 0, j =
0,
z. = 0, for all j 40 Ai}
in addition to the budget set -y (s i , Si , q,ri , C, L) defined earlier. The first step
proves the lower hemicontinuity of the correspondence aic , the next the lower hemi-
continuity of the correspondence 13!, and finally the lower hemicontinuity of -y!. In
the rest of the proof we suppress the index i.
1. Lower hernicontinuity of a,
We shall first show that a, : Rm x R+m --+ Rr4t+1 is a lower hemicontinuous corre-
spondence for all (.9, S) such that si < 0 < S. To prove lower hemicontinuity
consider z° E ac (s° , SO) satisfying the conditions mentioned.
Define
.11 =	 : Z; = OE
	
J2 =	 Sti =	 < 01,
= fj : 0 < z.; = S.71, 	 .14 =	 .11U J2U J31.
Consider a sequence (Sr, Sr) -4 (s°, S°) where si <
 O < S . We now wish to
find a sequence {Zr},
 Zr E ac (sr, Sr) such that Zr
 4 z° as (sr , S") --+ (s°, so),
the existence of such a sequence guaranteeing the lower hemicontinuity of ac .
Define
o 	 • ,--
= Z 3 a 4
	3 	 3 7
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= 0, je í1
j Ej2EJ3
By construction, zr E ac (sr, Sr) for all r sufficiently large. Moreover zr -÷ z°
for all j E Ji U J2 U J3 U J4. This establishes the lower hemicontinuity of ac.
2. Lower hemicontinuity of f3c
Let a be a vector of zeros and ones such that az =Erit_m+l z. Now consider the
correspondence 13c : Rm x R4Ä! x R+ 	. To prove lower hemicontinuity,
let z° E
 ß(s°, so , LO) and (sr , Sr , Lr)	 (so, $o , Lo‘ .) We now wish to find a se-
quence {9} , E
 ß(s', sr, Lf) such that e 	 z° as (e, Sr , li) --+ (s ° , S°, ).
Since z° E ac (s° , so), there is a subsequence zrk E ac(S' , gr ) such that zrk	 z°
(as was shown in the first part of the proof). LO > Ø implies that there also
exits E
 ß(s° , SO , LO) such that al < L°. Since 2 E ac (s° , 50) there is also a
sequence ir E ac (sr, Sir) such that i t.
Define e = Ar zrk (1 - Ar)ir where Ar is maximal for A E [13, 1] such that
azr <
 L. By construction xr E flc (sr , Sr, Lf ) for all r sufficiently large. Since
A is bounded, it has a limit point -A- , so let < 1 if possible. Hence the
sequence {zr} has a limit point 2 = Xz° + (1 — 3t- )i. Since < 1, this implies
that -A-az° + (1 = -L° (or else A < 1 is not maximal). But since ai <
this yields that az° > Lc', contradicting z° E ß(s°, S°, Li. Hence Ar 	1 and
Zr —+ Z° , which establishes that /3c is lower hemicontinuous.
3. Lower hemicontinuity of irc
Finally the lower hemicontinuity of the correspondence ifc : Rm x R+ x III:" x
R+ x R+ needs to be proved. To do this we need, for any z° E
ac(s° , S°, q°, 7°, C°, -L°) to find a sequence {zr}, zr E 7c ($r , gr , qr , Tr , Cr , Lr) ,
such that Zr zo as (sr , Sr , qr , rr , Cr , Lr) (so, So , go , To , co, LO) . This is
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done in the same manner as in part 2 of the proof under the assumption that
C > 0 (there then exits i E 7,(s0 , S°, q°, T° C° , Lc.) such that r°q°i < C°).
This completes the proof of lemma 1.
Lemma 2 The supply and demand functions zi (s i , S, 	 for the consumers
(i = m+1,...,m+N) are continuous in prices, initial resources and quantity constraints.
Proof: In the following we continue to suppress the index i. The claim would
be established if, given any sequence (Sr , Sr , qr , Tr , Cr , Lr )	 (8°, S° , q°, 7°, C°, LO),
zr = z (sr ,
	qr ,	 Cr, fir)	 Zr _+ zo where es = *0 , so , go , 7.0 , co , Lc )o . Define
= min eq?
j 	 3 3
We introduce e such that e > 0 and 4/ — e > O. Define
= (qi.),	 where qi. = ti — E for all j.
Then Zr E 07c (5r , sr , q*, Tr , Co E,Lr ) for all r large enough; this follows since
q.zr < Tr qrzr < co + E
for all r large. Since 7, (sr, Sr, q*, Tr , C° -Fe, Lr) is compact 1°, Zr must have a conver-
gent subsequence zrk -4 z* as k oo. Assume z* z(s°, S°, q°, 7°, C°, LO). This
implies that there exists a
 š which is such that u(i) > u(z*). Since rrprzr < Cr,
eq°z* < C° so that z* E ,D,c (so , so , go , To , co , Lo‘ .) Since the budget set 7,(s,
 S, q, r,
C, L) is lower hemicontinuous (see lemma 1) there is i t.
 E "gsr , Sr , qr , Tr , Cr , Lr )
such that ir 	Continuity of the utility function gives us that U (Zr) > u(ir)
iorq > 0 7c (s, S, q, r, C, L) is compact; suppose, to the contrary, that it is not so: since
-yc(s, S, q, r, C, L) is closed, there must be a sequence zn E 7c (s, S, q, r, C, L) and z.7 --+ -Foo. (This
is the only possibility, as 7c (s, S, q, r, C, L) is bounded below.) But this means that E qizi < C
must be violated for n large enough. So no such sequence can exist.
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u(z*) > u(i) 11 . This is a contradiction. So no such can exist, and consequently
z* z(s° ,
 S°, q°, 7° C° Le). Since this is true for any arbitrary limit point, zr	 Z°
A.2 Continuity of the firms' Drbze demand and supply func-
tions
We now look at two lemmas concerning the firms which are similar to those for the
consumers.
Lemma 3 The firm's budget correspondence 'y 	 lower hemicontinuous at every
point (st, Si q, t2i, C , 	such that qi > 0 and 0 < tv < 0, z < O < sj for all j,
Ci > 0, and Yi > O.
Proof: The proof follows mainly the proof of lemma 1 in the preceeding section.
The main difference is that there now is no constraint on hours worked but instead
a constraint on the firms' output. In the same manner as earlier we define
a1(S)
	 fzi : o < 4, J =
< zij <	 =	 •
0	 zij	St3:, =
0,
o, for all :7 Ail
and
i3i/ (si , Si , Yi )	 fzi :	 f(z) —
— .1 1<
	
= 	 i j
< zij <	 mi+17...,m, ij
"-Continuity of the preference relationship » is defined as follows. Let { zf} and	 be two
arbitrary sequences such that zr --+ z and ir --+ i. Then zr » ifr implies z
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0 5_	 j =
0,
zi — 0 for all j Ai}
in addition to the budget set -y i.f (s i , Si , q,
 r1 , Ci , Yi ) defined earlier. As in the proof of
lemma 1 we prove that the correspondences ai.f , Pip and iyif are lower hemicontinuous.
Also here we suppress the index i.
1. Lower hemicontinuity of a p
Proof of the lower hemicontinuity of the correspondence af : 11_11.+N	 li".41+1
follows from the proof of the lower hemicontinuity of the correspondence ac.
2. Lower hemicontinuity of ß f
Now consider Pf R_ x Rr.+N x R+ R741+ 1 . To prove lower hemicontinuity,
let z° E ß1(s ° , SO , Y°) and (sr, Sr, Yr) --+ (s°, S°, Y°). We now wish to find
a sequence {e }, zr E fif(sr, Sr, Yr) such that Zr	 zo as (sr , Sr , yr)
(so , S° , Y°). Since z° E a f(S°), there is a subsequence zrk E af(Sr) such that
zrk 	zo .
We first consider the situation where the sales constraint is an equality, f (z) —
Y = This occurs when considering a government firm (which also implies
that Y = 0) or when si = O. Define the function g(zo) = {f(z) : z = j =
1, . , m÷N}, where zo is the numeraire good money. Since f (z) is a monotonic
increasing function in zo , we have that g(zo) is invertable12, where the inverse
is denoted by Consequently choose Zr so that
Zor 	yr)
zt: = z? for j 03	 3
We then have that e E Of(sr, Sr, yr ) and that Zr 	Z° as r sr , yr ) —÷
(3° , S0 , Y° ).
'The function g is non-singular so that g(zo) = 0 implies that zo =
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When considering private firms where s
 < 0 we have that there, in addition
to z°, exits E ß1(s° , S°,1/°) such that ij < z; for all j and ij < z; for at
least one j. Since î E af (S°), there is also a sequence F E af(Sr) such that
Define zr = Ar .Zrk -I- (1 — Ar )ir where Ar is maximal for A E [O, 1] such that
f (zr) — yr
 —s:. By construction zr E /31 (.9-, Sr , Yr ). Since Ar is bounded, it
has a limit point A, so let )t- < 1 if possible. Hence the sequence {zr} has a limit
point i = -A- z° -I- (1— A')2. Since -.)■ < 1, this implies that f + (1 i) —17° =
—8° (or else -A < 1 is not maximal). z° > î implies that z° > -Åz° + (1—
when A < 1, leading to f(z°) _ yo > f("A zo + (1 A-)i) yo = —so, which
contradicts f(z°) — Y° < —s°. Hence A r –4. 1 and e 	 z°, which establishes
that Af
 is lower hemicontinuous.
3. Lower hemicontinuity of 71
The lower hemicontinuity of the correspondence 7f R_ x 1/1.r.+N x RT+ 1 x Rq. x
R+ X R+ --+ RV is proved by following the proof of the lower hemicontinuity
of Pc from lemma 1.
Lemma 4 The supply and demand functions z i (si ,
 S, q, ri, Ci , Yi ) for the firms
(i =1,...,M) are continuous in prices, initial resources and quantity constraints.
Proof: This follows the proof of the continuity of the demand and supply func-
tions of the consumer.
A.3 Existence of equilibrium
Using the notation introduced earlier in the appendix, theorem 1 in the main paper
can be formulated as follows. Note that Eim=1
	Si,q,tv,Ci,Yi)	 lidi where
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i = (k-j)IM+M and Eit'fAfN+1 4(si, Si, q, ri , C, L) = 1:i where j = k-o-mpti. Since we
are dealing with an open economy, condition 1.2 below only considers the markets
for the non-tradeable goods (including labor).
Theorem 1 Given any (q, ri , Ci , Yi) such that qi > 0 for all j while ri > 0, 1 >
t2i > 0, C i > 0, and Yi > 0 for all i, there exist maximum and minimum constraints
(si,
 Si) satisfying
1.1	 < 0,	 -= 1,...,M
o < sip 	 j = 	 _ for all i = 1,... 7m ,
	0,	 j =	 for all i = m+1,...,m÷N,
o <Sip 	j =	 for all i = 1,...,m+N, i j
	•2 yi (si ,
 S,
	Ci , Yi) —
	S,  t2i, Ci , Yi )
	
— V itf1+1 	ri, L, ci) = 0, j =
yi (si , , q, tv, Ci , Yi ) —	 Si, q , ri , L, C) = 0,	 j = m2+1,...,m,
MP+ ,	 = 0,
 i =
where zi(si S,
	 ,L) for i = m+1,...,m+N are the Drèze demands and sup-
plies which solve the problem
max	 (z2)
s.t. 	rtqzt< Ci,
NM
j=1
O zij , 	 = 1,...,m„
o < <	 = mi +1,...,m,
sij 	= (i_m)m+1,...,(i_m)m+m,
40 0,
zij = 0, for all j Ai
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and zi	 S,
	Ci 7 Yi) and yi (si S, 	 C,Y1 ) for i =	 are the
Drêze demands and supplies which solve the problem
max 	ir(z1 )
s.t. qzi < C i — E
< —y1 +Y <
< 37 j = J- 
0 < < S • =	 .7M27
O < < •=
4> 0,
= 0, for all j ■%3
1.3 	 1. —yi (si , Si , q, t2 , Ci , Yi ) =	 for some i implies that z(sh ,Sh ,q,t2i, Ch ,
hYh ) < S2h for all h =	 and zNsh, S, q , rh , ch , 7 < St for all h =
2. zi (s i ,Si ,q,tv, Ci , Yi ) = S for some i = 1,...atf and j	 m1+1,...7m or z.i (st,
si q, ri , Ci , L) = S for some i = Itf +1,...,M+N and j =	 implies
that —yi (si , 5i,q,t2j,Ci,Yi) >
3. si, q„ ri , Ci , L) = s for some i = m+1,...,m+N implies that
Sh
 q , t2h,, Ch ,Yh) < S I; for h = j(i-m)m;
4. zi (si,	 = s for some i = 1,...,m implies that -4	 sh
Th, 	 L) > s4 for h =3
Proof: Let fi* be a bound on the output of firm i,
fi* = {Yi
 Yi = fi (zi) 7zi = Ci qi 7 i=17...,m 7 Z = :7=M +OM 	 N +4 7
for all i =	 Furthermore let
=
1 ci - E vik invki,
k
ci + (111p,X W i j)L 7
3
when
 i =
when j = m+1,...,m+N,
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Vi 1 maix(Ci*/qj) -I- fi* + e,2max(Ci*/qj) + L -1--. e,, when j =when i = m+1,...,m+mN,
IJ, = [—V,0],
1,12 = [0 7
Il = X 71'3=1 1
12 = X 7-13=Mi-1-1 2 7
where e > 0 (and n =	 si E II, Si E. I2, and (si , Si) E
 Ii x 12 = 1. Thus,
{(s 1 7 sl) , (s2 S2) 7 7 (sNA-M
 SM)}N-FM‘ E /N+m .
Define
I* =	 Si)} : 	{(5i,
 Sill E im+N and Si
	Vi j = M1+1,-,M2, =
and	 si > Vj ,	 = m,÷1,...,m, i = m+1,...,m+N,
and	 >
 V , j = m+1,...,m+N, h = ci-oim+mj.
The set I* is non-empty, compact and convex. Following Mulcherji (1990) for each
{(si,St)} E I* define Q({(8t,S2 )}) = {(si i ,Sa i )} by
	s ij
	 f j =	 7
et
1+ 1 ki(si Si) I
— Vi - I kj(s i Si) 
1+ I kj(si, Si) I
Vi - I ki(si Si) 
1+ I ki (si Si) I
1+ 1 ki (si Si) I
if ki (s i , Si) < 0 and
 i =
otherwise,
if ki( , Si) <
otherwise,
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M	 M-FN
=	 +1,...,M.
=
ki(s, Si )
ly..7() — E zi () - E 40,
1=1	 i=M+1
M-FN
zijo - E z(.),
1=1	 i=m+1
where
Notice that {(sil , Si')} E /N, and
sÇ — S Si —	 Vi - I ki(si, Si) I1+ I ki(si, Si) I
> V.; if {(si , Si)} E I*
for j > M1 . We have thus constructed Q so that Q : I* -4 P. The continuity
of kj (-) established by virtue of lemma 2 and 4 implies that Q is a continuous
function from I* to itself. Hence by virtue of Brouwer's Fixed-Point Theorem, there
is { (Si*, si*)} E I* such that
Q[{(st*, si*)}l = {(si*, Si*)}.
We have thereby found that there exist maximum and minimum constraints for
any given (q,
 r, C, Yi). We now show that conditions 1.1 to 1.3 hold at {(si*, Si*)} .
Suppose that ki (si*,	 < 0 for some j > M1 . Then we get that
si.*
si* = 
	3
	=
3 	1+ I kie)	 3
for all i. Using the definition of ki(-) this implies that kj(-) > 0, which is a contra-
diction. Hence ki(s i*, Si*) > 0 for all j > /1/1 . Suppose that the strict inequality
holds for some
 i . Then
Sij*
Si; = 	 Si; = 1+ Ike)
a contradiction once again. Hence ki (si*,	 = 0 for all
 i 	0, implying that
Ei zo(s i*, 	 = E ci - T — ts. Thus, conditions 1.1 and 1.2 in theorem 1 hold at
{(s i* ,
 Si*)}.
71
The proof is completed by showing that condition 1.3 also holds at {(s i*, gi*)}.
First, suppose that for some j = mi+1,...,m there exits i such that
, Si*, q, ri , Ci) = S:r
and
—yi(si*, Sj*, q, r ,Ci) =
Then
4(-) =	 < Cij qj fi*
since —0-) =
	 implies that fi* s > 0. Therefore
Ci qi fi* > — > Vi
Or
0 > Vi
 — Ci I qi — fi* > e > 0,
which is a contradiction. Part 1 of condition 1.3 holds trivially for any .s! when
i =1, ..., Mi since no demanders are ever rationed in these tradeable goods. We
therefore have that parts 1 and 2 of condition 1.3 must hold. Finally, suppose that
for some j = m+1,...,m+mN there exits i E [1,...,m ] , k E [m+1,...,m+N] such that
zij (si* , Si* q, ,Ci) = S:r
and
z iF sk* qk*	 f-yk)	 k*7 	 = s . .3 k 	 ,q,	 ,	 3
Then
S.ir<Cilqj d-Li-dr, since L s3k. * > O.
Therefore
Cilqj 	>	 >Vj
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Or
0 > Vj — Ci qj 	> e >0,
which again is a contradiction. Hence condition 1.3 in theorem 1 must hold at
{(Si*,
	This completes the proof of the proposition.
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